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On the Social Conditions of Governance: Social Capital and Governance in Areas of 
Limited Statehood
Johannes Kode
Abstract:
Unlike what Hobbesian theories argue, the provision of governance is not necessarily undermined by a 
lack of statehood. Empirical findings show that – contrary to many voices in current debates on weak, 
failing, or failed states – various (non-state) actors provide governance even when statehood is limited. 
This paper addresses the puzzle of how to account for cases where governance exists although the state 
cannot or does not provide it. Transferring insights from political sociology to the analysis of such “gov-
ernance without the state,” the paper holds that the way societies manage their affairs critically depends 
on social conditions, which are captured here following social capital theory. Working toward a political 
sociology of “governance without a state,” this paper links social capital, resulting in interpersonal trust, to 
social coordination underlying the provision of governance. In this context, governance is interpreted as 
a collective action game (“governance game”), in which socially embedded (collective) actors are seen as 
players whose behavior (in particular their decisions to cooperate) depends critically on their social capital 
endowments. The main argument is that specific types of social capital endowments facilitate – and, thus, 
explain – specific modes of social coordination in areas of limited statehood. Explorative in nature, con-
ceptual and theoretical arguments will be developed that offer new perspectives to explain the variance and 
mechanisms of governance outside the OECD world.
Zusammenfassung:
Im Gegensatz zu Hobb’schen Argumentationen ist die Bereitstellung von Governance nicht notwendi-
gerweise an starke Staatlichkeit gebunden: Empirische Belege zeigen, dass verschiedene (nicht-staatliche) 
Akteure Governance-Leistungen trotz zumindest begrenzter Staatlichkeit bereitstellen – entgegen vieler 
Stimmen in zeitgenössischen Diskursen zu schwacher und gescheiterter Staatlichkeit. Der Aufsatz geht 
der Frage nach, wie die Fälle erklärt werden können, wo Governance erfolgreich bereitgestellt wird obwohl 
der Staat entweder keine Governance-Leistungen erbringt oder erbringen kann. Im Rahmen des Transfers 
von Forschungsergebnissen der Politischen Soziologie in die Analyse von „Governance ohne Staat“ geht 
der Aufsatz von der Annahme aus, dass Art und Weise wie Gesellschaften sich organisieren maßgeblich 
von deren sozialstruktureller Bedingtheit abhängen. Diese spezifiziert der Aufsatz mithilfe des Sozialkapi-
taltheorie. Auf dem Weg zu einer Politischen Soziologie der „Governance ohne Staat“, stellt der Aufsatz 
die Beziehung zwischen Sozialkapital, vor allem in seiner Ausprägung als interpersonelles Vertrauen, und 
sozialer Handlungskoordination als Grundlage von Governance her. In diesem Kontext wird die Bereit-
stellung von Governance als Spiel kollektiven Handelns verstanden („Governance Game“), in dem das 
Verhalten sozial-eingebetteter (kollektiver) Akteure (und insbesondere ihre Kooperationsentscheidungen) 
maßgeblich von dem Umfang ihres Sozialkapitals abhängen. Das zentrale Argument des Aufsatzes ist, 
dass spezifische Typen von Sozialkapital bestimmte Modi der sozialen Handlungskoordination in Räumen 
begrenzter Staatlichkeit ermöglichen und entsprechend erklären. Im Rahmen eines explorativen Zugangs 
werden konzeptuelle und theoretische Begründungen vorgebracht, die bei der Erklärung der Varianz und 
der Prozesse von Governance außerhalb der OECD-Welt neue Perspektiven eröffnen.
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1. Introduction
„Communities	that	have	been	cut	off	from	an	effective	state	authority	–	whether	
out	of	governmental	 indifference	 to	marginal	 frontier	 territories,	or	because	of	
protracted	warfare,	or	because	of	vested	local	and	external	interests	in	perpetuating	
conditions	of	state	failure	–	consistently	seek	to	devise	arrangements	to	provide	
for	themselves	the	core	functions	that	the	missing	state	is	supposed	to	assume,	
especially	basic	security“	(Brynen	2008,	75).
The	challenges	associated	with	failing	or	failed	states	–	or	“limited	statehood”	(Risse	and	Lehm-
kuhl	2006,	9ff.)	–	are	perceived	as	domestic	as	well	as	international	issues	of	immense	policy	
importance	(e.g.,	Fukuyama	2005,	xiii-xx).	“Areas	of	limited	statehood”	are	understood	as	states	
or	parts	of	states
„in	 which	 central	 authorities	 (governments)	 lack	 the	 ability	 to	 implement	 and	
enforce	rules	and	decisions	or	in	which	the	legitimate	monopoly	over	the	means	
of	violence	 is	 lacking,	or	both,	at	 least	 temporarily.	The	ability	 to	enforce	rules	
or	to	control	 the	means	of	violence	can	be	restricted	along	various	dimensions:	
territorially;	sectorally	(i.e.	with	regard	to	specific	policy	areas);	socially	(i.e.	with	
regard	 to	 specific	 parts	 of	 the	 population);	 and	 temporarily“	 (Börzel	 and	Risse	
2010,	118-9).
Robert	Rotberg	sums	up	the	implications	well:	“the	existence	of	these	kinds	of	countries,	and	
the	instability	that	they	harbor,	not	only	threatens	the	lives	and	livelihoods	of	their	own	peoples	
but	endangers	world	peace”	(2002,	128).	In	response	to	state	failure,	externally-led	state-building	
projects	have	aimed	at	(re)building	OECD-like	effective	and	legitimate	state	institutions,	which	
have	 become	 the	 conceptual	 blueprint	 for	 statehood	 around	 the	 globe	 (Brinkerhoff	 2005;	
Fukuyama	2005).	The	goal	is	to	build	stable	and	democratic	states	(Grimm	and	Merkel	2009;	
Ottaway	2002),	 especially	 in	post-conflict	 contexts	 (Paris	 and	Sisk	2009,	 2ff).	Many	 share	 the	
opinion	 that	 “functioning	 and	 effective	 state	 institutions	 are	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 sustainable	
development”	(Boege,	Brown,	and	Clements	2009,	13).
Gaining	particular	momentum	from	2004	onward,	state	building	has	also	become	part	of	cur-
rent	academic	discourses:	Francis	Fukuyama,	Simon	Chesterman,	James	Fearon,	David	Laitin,	
Stephen	Krasner,	Roland	Paris,	and	others	have	each	recently	put	their	own	spin	on	the	debate	
asking	why	building	states	 is	of	great	 importance	both	domestically	and	 internationally	 (cp.	
Paris	and	Sisk	2009,	8-9).
While	a	strong	state	is	often	seen	as	necessary,	a	close	look	at	the	empirical	reality	on	the	ground	
calls	into	question	the	state’s	role	as	a	necessary	precondition	for	security,	peace,	development,	
and,	more	broadly,	the	provision	of	public	goods.	Countries	without	strong	state	institutions	
are	seldom	void	of	governance:	“Weak	or	limited	statehood	does	not	automatically	translate	into	
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weak	governance.	‘Governance	without	a	state’	(Risse	&	Lehmkuhl	2007;	Risse	2010)	appears	to	
be	an	empirical	reality	in	many	parts	of	the	world”	(Börzel	and	Risse	2010,	120).
In	order	to	conceptually	capture	“functional	equivalents	of	statehood”	(Draude	2007),	previous	
work	has	adapted	 the	concept	of	governance,	 specified	as	“institutionalized	modes	of	 social	
coordination	 to	 produce	 and	 implement	 collectively	 binding	 rules,	 or	 to	 provide	 collective	
goods”	(see	e.g.	Mayntz	2009	and	Risse	2010,	8).	This	approach	provides	an	alternative	to	state-
centered	“OECDism”	 (for	 a	 critical	 discussion	 of	 the	 state	 preoccupation	 in	 social	 sciences,	
see	e.g.	Ferguson	and	Mansbach	2004,	107ff.).	Furthermore,	the	concept	of	governance	allows	
research	to	see	the	state	as	“only	one	collective	actor”	among	others	(Ferguson	and	Mansbach	
2004,	108).	It	focuses	on	the	empirical	question	of	“who	engages	in	what	kind	of	coordination	
to	provide	security,	order	and	welfare	for	a	community“	(Börzel	2010,	21),	placing	it	at	the	center	
of	analysis.
The	 observed	 forms	 of	 governance	without	 the	 state	 stand	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	Hobbesian	
argument,	which	 is	 broadly	 echoed	 in	 current	 debates	 on	weak,	 failing,	 or	 failed	 states;	 the	
absence	 of	 the	 state’s	 monopoly	 on	 violence	 does	 not	 necessarily	 imply	 an	 uncooperative	
natural	state	in	which	the	bellum omnium contra omnes	prevails	and	life	is	“solitary,	poor,	nasty,	
brutish,	and	short”	 (Hobbes	1651	 [1986],	186).	Thus,	governance	without	the	state	forces	us	to	
recast	our	conceptual	apparatus,	as	Boege	et	al.	have	already	stated:	“there	is	a	need	to	develop	
alternative	non-state-centric	approaches	to	governance,	the	control	of	violence,	peace-building,	
and	development”	(Boege,	Brown,	and	Clements	2009,	14).
Political Sociology
Political	sociology,	developed	in	the	context	of	strong	state	institutions,	has	stressed	throughout	
its	 history	 that	 the	way	 societies	manage	 their	 affairs	 is	 critically	 dependent	 on	 underlying	
social	and	cultural	factors.	From	this	perspective,	political	institutions	are	seen	as	embedded	in	
society	and	its	social	structures,	often	shaped	by	cultural	meaning.	The	way	political	institutions	
are	created	and	maintained	is	linked	to	various	social	conditions.	During	the	last	three	decades,	
political	 sociology	 has	 often	 conceptualized	 these	 conditions	 as	 “social	 capital,”	 comprised	
of	norms,	interpersonal	trust,	and	networks	(for	an	overview,	see	Field	2003).	The	concept	of	
social	capital	has	been	linked	to	various	social	phenomena,	ranging	from	the	functioning	of	
democratic	 institutions	 (Putnam,	Leonardi,	 and	Nanetti	 1993),	 transitions	 to	democracy	 (e.g.,	
Badescu	and	Uslaner	2003),	economic	development	(Annen	2003;	Knack	and	Keefer	1997;	Solow	
1999;	Woolcock	1998;	Woolcock	2001),	and,	negatively,	to	corruption	(Harris	2007).	Furthermore,	
it	is	seen	as	being	closely	linked	to	vibrant	civil	societies	(e.g.	Fukuyama	2001).
According	 to	Elinor	Ostrom	and	T.	K.	Ahn,	 social	 capital	“helps	 to	 synthesize	how	cultural,	
social,	 and	 institutional	 aspects	 of	 communities	 jointly	 affect	 their	 capacity	 to	 deal	 with	
collective-action	 problems”	 (Ostrom	 and	Ahn	 2003,	 xvi).	While	 political	 sociology	 has	 often	
analyzed	governance	by	the	state,	the	discipline	has	rarely	been	applied	to	non-Western	forms	
of	governance	outside	the	OECD	context.
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This	 working	 paper	 strives	 to	 transfer	 insights	 from	 political	 sociology	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	
governance	 without	 the	 state.	 It	 addresses	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 different	 types	 and	
endowments	 of	 social	 capital	 can	 partially	 explain	 different	 modes	 of	 coordination	 as	 an	
important	dimension	of	governance	in	areas	of	limited	statehood.	Working	toward	a	political	
sociology	of	governance	without	the	state,	I	will	conceptually	link	aggregated	social	capital	to	the	
ways	in	which	actors	engage	in	the	provision	of	governance.	Explorative	in	nature,	conceptual	
and	theoretical	arguments	will	be	developed	that	help	to	explain	the	variance	of	governance	
outside	the	OECD	world.	Finally,	I	will	propose	corresponding	paths	for	future	research.	Where	
necessary,	arguments	will	be	illustrated	by	empirical	data	as	a	“plausibility	probe”	(Eckstein).	
At	 the	 core	 of	 this	 paper	 lies	 the	 attempt	 to	 outline	micro–macro	 linkages	 using	 different	
theoretical	models	as	a	multi-method	approach	(cp.	e.g.	George	and	Bennett	2005,	34f.).
Throughout	this	paper,	governance	is	seen	as	the	outcome	of	collective	action,	since	different	
actors	have	to	coordinate	their	behavior	to	set	up	and	institutionalize	modes	of	interaction	for	
the	provision	of	binding	rules	and	public	goods.	In	this	somewhat	Hobbesian	view,	the	state	
–with	its	monopoly	on	violence	paired	with	its	ability	to	enforce	binding	rules	–	is	a	functional	
solution	to	the	essential	problems	of	collective	action	and,	thus,	to	the	problem	of	coordination.	
As	Elinor	Ostrom	states,	“the	theory	of	collective	action	is	…	the	core	of	the	justification	for	the	
state”	(Ostrom	1998,	1).	States	with	“domestic	sovereignty”	(Krasner	1999,	4)	facilitate	collective	
action	 by	 effectively	 enforcing	 rules	 that	 regulate	 interaction	 and	 hierarchically	 coordinate	
actors’	behavior	to	provide	public	goods.
Analyzing	governance	beyond	the	state	requires	addressing	the	question	of	what	can	substitute	
for	the	state	to	facilitate	a	Hobbesian	“Leviathan.”	Circumscribed	domestic	sovereignty	raises	
the	question	posed	by	Douglass	C.	North:	“Under	what	conditions	can	voluntary	cooperation	
exist	without	the	Hobbesian	solution	of	the	imposition	of	a	coercive	state	to	create	cooperative	
solutions?”	(1990,	14).	The	empirical	reality	of	non-state	governance	presents	a	puzzle	for	the	
largely	state-centered	governance	discourse	in	this	regard,	which	has	largely	ignored	North’s	
central	question	thus	far.	Börzel	and	Risse	rightly	ask:	“Why	does	governance	research	in	Western	
developed	countries	show	that	‘new’	modes	of	governance	require	consolidated	statehood	and	a	
strong	shadow	of	hierarchy,	while	‘governance	without	a	state’	appears	to	be	widespread	in	areas	
of	limited	statehood?”	(2010,	120).
This	 working	 paper	 argues	 that	 social	 capital	 enables	 actors	 to	 overcome	 collective	 action	
problems	and	 subsequently	 to	 coordinate	 their	behavior	 in	 the	 absence	of	 statehood	as	 the	
“Leviathan.”	In	particular,	it	will	be	argued	that	high	levels	of	interpersonal	trust	–	the	outcome	
of	high	aggregated	levels	of	social	capital	(Ahn	and	Ostrom	2008;	2003)	–	change	the	way	that	
actors	play	what	will	 be	 conceptualized	 as	 the	“governance	 game.”	This	working	paper	 thus	
focuses	on	two	modes	of	coordination	(hierarchical	and	non-hierarchical)	and	analyzes	their	
social	capital	prerequisites.
It	will	be	argued	that	social	capital	is	a	sufficient	but	not	necessary	condition	for	governance	
without	the	state,	as	Fukuyama	similarly	states	for	coordination	in	general:	“It	is	of	course	pos-
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sible	to	achieve	coordinated	action	among	a	group	of	people	possessing	no	social	capital,	but	
this	would	presumably	entail	additional	transaction	costs	of	monitoring,	negotiating,	litigating,	
and	enforcing	formal	agreements”	 (Fukuyama	2001,	10).	The	alternative	costs	of	coordinated	
action	without	social	capital	seem	especially	prohibitive	where	the	state	does	not	enforce	rules	
necessary	for	agreements.
The	scope	condition	of	my	project	is	that	different	actors	have	incentives	to	provide	governance	
in	the	first	place.	As	Börzel	and	Risse	have	argued	(2010,	120-21),	these	incentives	can	stem	from	
the	“risk	of	anarchy”	that	actors	face,	the	involvement	of	external	actors,	or	normative	structures	
(where	“local	community	norms	lead	to	governance”).	While	taking	for	granted	that	actors	are	
motivated	to	engage	in	the	governance	game,	I	will	address	the	question	of	how	social	capital	
enables	them	to	successfully	coordinate	without	falling	into	what	Rothstein	has	labeled	“social	
traps”	(Rothstein	2005).
Chapter One will	summarize	the	current	literature	on	social	capital.	In	doing	so,	it	will	focus	
on	what	 political	 sociology	 has	 to	 offer	 in	 terms	 of	 understanding	 (institutionalized)	 social	
coordination,	and	will	locate	the	primary	research	gaps.	The	two	core	concepts	of	social	capital	
and	governance	will	subsequently	be	summarized	and	further	specified.	The	remainder	will	
address	a	few	meta-theoretical	premises	as	well	as	the	theoretical	framework	with	regard	to	the	
link	between	social	capital	and	interaction.	
Chapter Two will	 delineate	 how	hierarchical	 and	 non-hierarchical	 coordination	 in	 areas	 of	
limited	statehood	are	enabled	by	particular	social	capital	endowments,	and	it	will	 formulate	
corresponding	 propositions.	 Specifically,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 social	 capital	 can	 increase	 the	
legitimacy	 of	 hierarchical	 coordination.	 Furthermore,	 “bridging”	 social	 capital	 (Woolcock	
2001,	 12-13)	 facilitates	 horizontal	 coordination	 by	 increasing	 the	 trustworthiness	 of	 actors,	
which	reduces	collective	action	problems	underlying	the	provision	of	governance	without	the	
hierarchical	enforcement	of	contracts	and	rules.
The	 last	 section	of	 the	 chapter	examines	 the	 role	of	 trust	networks	 for	governance	 in	areas	
of	 limited	statehood.	This	section	also	attempts	 to	shed	 light	on	 the	possible	“dark	side”	of	
social	capital	 in	areas	of	 limited	statehood,	arguing	that	 it	can	undermine	the	 inclusiveness	
of	governance	provision,	especially	if	 it	prevails	in	its	“bonding”	type	 (Woolcock	2001,	12-13).	
The	outcome	is	a	form	of	“clustered	governance”	associated	with	confined	and	strong	social	
networks	that	only	provide	governance	in	an	exclusive	way.
Chapter Three	will	draw	conclusions	from	the	previous	chapters	and	discuss	some	limitations	
of	the	arguments	presented	and	approaches	taken.	After	providing	thoughts	on	future	empirical	
research,	discussing	the	availability	of	data	as	well	as	some	other	empirical	issues	in	detail,	the	
chapter	will	conclude	with	broader	theoretical	and	policy-relevant	implications.
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2. Setting the Stage
2.1 Political Sociology and Limited Statehood
Political	sociology	addresses	the	relationship	between	political	institutions	and	their	underlying	
social	 structures.	Thus,	 it	 is	 about	 state–society	 relations.	Most	 political	 sociologists	 would	
probably	agree	with	James	C.	Scott:	“Formal	order	…	is	always	and	to	some	considerable	degree	
parasitic	on	informal	processes,	which	the	formal	scheme	does	not	recognize,	without	which	it	
could	not	exist,	and	which	it	alone	cannot	create	or	maintain”	(Scott	1998,	310).	Political	sociology	
attempts	to	disentangle	the	relationships	between	formal	(political)	order	and	informal	(social)	
processes.
Social	and	cultural	factors,	as	many	have	argued,	shape	institutions	and	organizations	in	various	
ways.	Moreover,	they	account	for	social	interaction,	collective	action,	and	identity,	among	other	
things.	 Numerous	 approaches	 have	 been	 developed	 in	 the	 OECD	 context	 to	 capture	 these	
factors,	ranging	from	Marxist	accounts	to	new	institutional	economics.	Scholars	have	argued	
that	cultural	heritage	contributes	to	state	stability,	for	example	by	providing	cultural	symbols	for	
identity	(Odendahl	and	Peters	2009);	that	education	is	likely	to	prevent	voters	from	extremism	
and	supports	democratic	practices	(Lipset	1959,	79);	that	religion	affects	democracy	(Huntington	
1991;	for	an	overview,	see	Weiffen	2009,	94ff.);	or	that	class	structure	–	bourgeoisie	(Moore	1966),	
middle	class	(Lipset	1959),	or	working	class	(Collier	and	Collier	1991;	Rüschemeyer,	Stephens,	
and	Stephens	1992)	–	has	paved	the	way	for	democracy	(cp.	also	March	and	Olsen	1984,	735).	Many	
more	interactions	between	social	and	cultural	factors	on	the	one	side	and	state	institutions	on	
the	 other	 side	 have	 been	 researched	 (see	Nash	 and	 Scott	 2001).	 Several	 accounts	 are	 united	
around	the	argument	that	a	congruence	between	polity	and	political	culture	is	necessary	but	
not	sufficient	for	the	consolidation	of	(young)	democratic	regimes	(regarding	the	general	role	
of	culture,	see	e.g.	Clague,	Gleason,	and	Knack	2001;	Huntington	1991;	Inglehart	1988;	Inglehart	
and	Welzel	2005;	Jackman	and	Miller	2004;	Lipset	1959;	Putnam,	Leonardi,	and	Nanetti	1993;	Pye	
and	Verba	1965;	Tessler	and	Gao	2008).
As	March	and	Olsen	outline,	many	of	these	accounts	fall	into	the	category	of	contextual	accounts	
that	 claim	 that,	“class,	 geography,	 climate,	 ethnicity,	 language,	 culture,	 economic	 conditions,	
demography,	 technology,	 ideology,	 and	 religion	 all	 affect	 politics	 but	 are	 not	 significantly	
affected	by	politics”	(March	and	Olsen	1984,	735).	Others	are	rather	“reductionist,”	focusing	on	
micro-level	social	interactions	to	explain	macro	phenomena	(cp.	March	and	Olsen	1984,	735f.),	
or	“institutionalist,”	 stressing	 the	 idea	 that	 institutions	 shape	micro-level	 interactions.	This	
latter	approach	often	claims	that	 the	state	 is	“not	only	affected	by	society	but	also	affects	 it”	
(March	and	Olsen	1984,	738).
In	the	tradition	of	Tocqueville,	the	role	of	“civic	associations,”	seen	as	the	“flipside”	of	democracy	
(van	Deth	2010,	118),	has	gained	a	lot	of	attention.	In	this	context,	“vibrant”	civil	societies	are	seen	
as	beneficially	resulting	in	“accountability,”	“voice	and	participation,”	and	“democratic	culture,”	
all	 of	 which	 are	 seen	 as	 essential	 for	 the	 functioning	 of	 democratic	 institutions	 (Caparini	
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2010,	245;	Fukuyama	2001;	Ottaway	2000,	4;	Tusalem	2007;	White	1996).	One	way	that	societies	
organized	into	civic	associations	can	benefit	democratic	institutions	is	by	functioning	as	“schools	
of	democracy,”	in	which	cooperative	norms	are	socialized	(cp.	Rothstein	and	Stolle	2008,	4).
The	 outcome	 of	 associational/social	 life	 has	 often	 been	 linked	 to	 social	 capital	 (see	 e.g.	
Fukuyama	2001;	Ottaway	2000,	10)	in	the	tradition	of	previous	sociological	work	by	Bourdieu,	
Coleman,	and	others	(for	the	history	of	the	concept	see	Field	2003).	Social	capital	is	often	seen	
as	resulting	from	social	interactions	and	structures,	the	outcome	of	“social	embeddedness”	(as	
coined	by	Polanyi	1944).	According	to	the	seminal	study	Making Democracy Work	by	Putnam	et	
al.,	social	capital	refers	to	“features	of	social	organization,	such	as	trust,	norms,	and	networks,	
that	can	improve	the	efficiency	of	society	by	facilitating	coordinated	actions.”	It	therefore	leads	
to	better	“institutional	performance”	(Putnam,	Leonardi,	and	Nanetti	1993,	8,	167),	especially	in	
democratic	contexts	(cp.	also	Adam	2007;	Badescu	and	Uslaner	2003;	Gabriel	et	al.	2002).	Social	
capital	bred	in	civic	associations,	so	the	core	argument	goes,	results	in	and	derives	from	civic	
engagement,	loyalty	toward	the	community,	and	compliance	(Levi	and	Stoker	2000),	which	are	
seen	as	important	for	democratic	performance	(see	also	Fukuyama	2001).	Interpersonal	trust	
–seen	as	the	most	important	manifestation	of	social	capital,	according	to	T.	K.	Ahn	and	Elinor	
Ostrom	 (2008)	–	 is	also	considered	quintessential	 for	democratic	governance	 (e.g.	Bjørnskov	
2007,	2010;	Letki	2006;	Newton	2006;	Offe	1999;	Tilly	2000).
Social	capital	is	widely	perceived	as	“a	panacea	for	many	fundamental	problems	that	affect	modern	
societies”	(Radnitz,	Wheatley,	and	Zürcher	2009,	707).	Among	social	and	cultural	variables,	social	
capital	has	recently	received	an	outstanding	amount	of	attention,	lighting	a	“bushfire	in	the	social	
sciences”	(Field	2003,	1).	A	lot	of	policy	makers	and	intergovernmental	organizations	have	adopted	
the	 concept	 as	 well	 (cp.	 e.g.	 Field	 2003,	 9).	 Its	 researched	 outcomes	 include	“well-performing	
democratic	institutions	(Putnam	et	al.	1993,	Newton	1999b,	Woolcook	2001),	personal	happiness	
(Helliwell	2002),	optimism	and	tolerance	(Uslaner	2002),	economic	growth	(Knack	&	Keefer	1997,	
Zak	&	Knack	2001),	and	democratic	stability	(Inglehart	1999)”	(Rothstein	and	Stolle	2008,	3).
Elinor	Ostrom	and	T.	K.	Ahn,	among	the	few	social	capital	theorists	who	place	social	capital	in	
a	coherent	conceptual	and	broader	theoretical	framework,	have	conceptualized	social	capital	
“as	an	attribute	of	 individuals	and	of	 their	 relationships	 that	enhances	 their	ability	 to	 solve	
collective-action	problems”	(2003,	xiv).	It	is	a	(collective)	actor-level	attribute,	but	it	can	also	be	
used	in	its	aggregated	form	(see	Jansen	2006,	32ff.).	It	is	“capital”	in	the	sense	that	it	can	be	seen	
as	an	asset.	Actors	can	invest	in	it	when	expecting	future	benefits,	as	Adler	and	Kwon	argue	in	
their	discussion	on	the	subject:
„Through	 investment	 in	 building	 their	 network	 of	 external	 relations,	 both	
individual	and	collective	actors	can	augment	their	social	capital	and	thereby	gain	
benefits	 in	 the	 form	 of	 superior	 access	 to	 information,	 power,	 and	 solidarity;	
and	by	investing	in	the	development	of	their	internal	relations,	collective	actors	
can	strengthen	their	collective	identity	and	augment	their	capacity	for	collective	
action“	(Adler	and	Kwon	2002,	21;	see	also	Lin	1999,	30).
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Moreover,	social	capital	is	“capital”	in	the	sense	that	it	is	“appropriable”	(Coleman):	“An	actor’s	
network	of,	say,	friendship	ties	can	be	used	for	other	purposes,	such	as	information	gathering	
or	advice”	(Adler	and	Kwon	2002,	21).	It	is	also	“convertible”	like	other	forms	of	capital	(ibid.).
According	to	Ostrom	and	Ahn’s	theory,	social	capital	resolves	collective	action	dilemmas	by	in-
creasing	interpersonal	trust	amongst	actors	that	facilitates	coordination.	This	account	connects	
social	capital	 theory	conceptually	with	research	on	trust	 in	various	organizations	 (Dirks	and	
Ferrin	2001;	Kramer	1999).	Moreover,	social	capital	allows	us	to	link	social	conditions	to	meso	
and	macro	social	phenomena	as	outcomes	of	social	interaction	(Field	2003,	7;	Jansen	2006,	27).
Instead	of	focusing	on	the	beneficial	outcomes	of	associational	membership	(Putnam,	Leonardi,	
and	Nanetti	1993),	this	paper	adapts	the	broader	concept	of	social	capital	from	Ostrom	and	Ahn,	
who	define	it	as	the	outcome	of	trustworthiness,	social	networks,	and	formal	as	well	as	informal	
institutions	(Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003).	This	concept	seems	more	appropriate	when	transferring	
the	theory	of	social	capital	to	societies	without	centuries-long	traditions	of	civic	associations.	
It	circumvents	the	link	between	social	capital,	democratic	institutions,	and	“political	trust”	–	a	
link	that	has	often	been	made	but,	even	in	the	OECD	context,	lacks	empirical	evidence.	Before	
elaborating	on	the	social	capital	concept	at	the	root	of	this	paper,	however,	it	is	important	to	
discuss	some	general	aspects	of	the	social	capital	theory.
Does Social Capital Support Democracy?
During	its	heyday	following	Putnam	et	al.’s	study	in	1993,	social	capital	was	sweepingly	interpreted	
as	 beneficial	 to	 democratic	 regimes	 in	 general.	 Studies	 about	 aspects	 of	 social	 capital	 and	
democracy	mushroomed.	However,	severe	critique	has	been	leveled	against	the	methodologies	
often	employed	to	show	the	beneficial	effects	of	social	capital	(e.g.,	Jackman	and	Miller	1998;	
2004).	In	particular,	scholars	have	called	into	question	one	of	the	core	arguments	stating	that	
associational	membership	automatically	translates	into	higher	levels	of	interpersonal	trust	and	
cooperation.	According	to	Rothstein	and	Stolle,	“members	become	purely	more	trusting	of	their	
fellow	members	and	they	cooperate	more	for	group	purposes	only”	(Rothstein	and	Stolle	2008,	
5);	they	do	not	develop	increased	trust	or	cooperate	beyond	the	context	of	the	group.	Moreover,	
theories	that	link	social	capital	to	trust	in	political	institutions	and	to	attitudinal	support	for	
democratic	 institutions	 have	 been	 critiqued	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 contrary	 empirical	 evidence	
(Ciftci	2010;	Jamal	2007,	127ff.).	In	Jamal’s	empirical	study	on	social	capital	in	the	West	Bank,	for	
instance,	the	author	shows	that	social	capital’s	relationship	to	civic	engagement	and	support	for	
democratic	institutions	is	largely	contextual.	It	depends	on	the	particular	political	context	and	
on	how	the	civic	organizations	are	organized	themselves	(2007,	80).	Jamal	also	offers	evidence	
that	social	capital	works	differently	in	contexts	where	formal	democratic	state	institutions	and	
social	capital	have	not	evolved	interdependently	over	the	course	of	centuries.	Further	empirical	
studies	that	correlate	associational	membership	with	social	capital	indicate	that	there	is	not	a	
straightforward	causal	link.	According	to	Rothstein	and	Stolle,	
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„Generally,	the	struggle	to	distinguish	between	‚the	good,	the	bad	and	the	ugly‘	in	
the	world	of	voluntary	associations	underlines	the	lack	of	theoretical	parameters	
that	define	a	micro-theory	of	social	capital.	Our	conclusion	from	this	research	is	
that	the	use	of	membership	in	adult	voluntary	associations	as	a	measurement	of	
social	capital	should	be	handled	with	great	caution,	and	that	its	use	as	a	producer	
of	social	capital	is	in	all	likelihood	misplaced“	(2008,	6).
Because	of	the	unclear	role	social	capital	plays	for	democratic	institutions,	I	will	focus	on	the	
more	promising	link	between	different	kinds	of	social	capital	and	the	general	ability	of	societies	
to	overcome	collective	action	problems.
Is There Only One Type of Social Capital?
In	the	social	capital	literature,	a	distinction	is	made	between	bonding,	bridging,	and linking	social	
capital	(see	Field	2003;	Woolcock	and	Narayan	2000).	Bonding	types	refer	to	social	capital	within	
socially	 confined	 groups	 and	 networks	 that	 maintain	 strong,	 in-group	 loyalty	 while	 often	
reinforcing	 specific	 (exclusive)	 identities.	 It	 has	 been	 associated	 with	 Granovetter’s	 concept	
of	“strong”	network	ties	 (Granovetter	1973,	 1983;	Lin	2003).	Bridging	social	capital	refers	 to	a	
larger	radius	of	trust	and	cooperative	behavior	that	reaches	out	to	people	who	share	only	some	
similarities	 (cp.	Fukuyama	2001;	Putnam	2000,	22ff.;	Woolcock	2001,	71-72).	 It	has	often	been	
the	subject	of	social	capital	analyses	on	the	state	level.	It	can	broadly	be	identified	with	“weak”	
ties	in	Granovetter’s	network	theory	(Granovetter	1973)	and	is	rather	“inclusive”	compared	to	
bonding	social	capital.	Linking	social	capital,	so	far	the	least	theoretically	developed	concept,	
refers	to	a	vertical	dimension	consisting	of	“relationships	up	and	down	the	social	and	economic	
scale”	(Field	2003,	66),	including	trust	toward	formal	institutions.
In	 the	 OECD	 context,	 bridging	 social	 capital	 is	 seen	 as	 complementary	 to	 formal	 state	
institutions,	for	it	enables	collective	action	regardless	of	the	actors’	particular	social	positions.	
It	facilitates	cooperation	across	the	society.	In	contrast,	bonding	social	capital	is	often	thought	
to	undermine	democratic	institutions	(Woolcock	and	Narayan	2000,	237-8).	Strong	bonds	may	
lead	to	exclusive,	in-group	provisions	of	club	goods	and	to	burdening	societies	with	negative	
externalities.	For	instance,	solidarity	among	gang	members	undermines	general	security	 (cp.	
Putnam	2000,	315-316).	Bonding	social	capital	can	also	potentially	encourage	rent-seeking	(cp.	
Olson	1982)	by	various	groups.	It	undermines	state-level	efficiency	by	exclusively	using	network	
resources	and	bolstering	corruption	(Harris	2007),	as	well	as	by	creating	clientelistic	structures	
(Jamal	2007).
Social Capital and Governance: Source or Outcome? 
The	 transfer	 of	 social	 capital	 theory	 to	 areas	 of	 limited	 statehood	 faces	 the	 problem	 of	
endogeneity:	 If	 social	capital	 is	 the	outcome	of	effective	governance	provision	 (including	an	
environment	 for	peaceful	 social	 interactions),	 social	capital	cannot	be	used	as	an	explaining	
variable	for	governance	(cp.	on	this	problem	Börzel	2007,	55).	A	lot	of	thought	has	already	been	
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dedicated	to	the	question	of	whether	social	capital	is	an	exogenous	(“culturalist”)	or	endogenous	
(“institutionalist”)	variable	(see	e.g.	Hooghe	and	Stolle	2003;	Jackman	and	Miller	1998).	
Some	argue	that	social	capital	is	exogenous	when	analyzed	in	the	context	of	political	institutions.	
They	argue	that	social	capital	originates	in	culture,	historical	experiences,	and	collective	memory	
(e.g.,	Fukuyama	1996;	Guiso,	Sapienza,	and	Zingales	2008;	Putnam,	Leonardi,	and	Nanetti	1993;	
Rothstein	2005,	148ff.),	or	even	in	religious	traditions	(see	various	contributors	in	Smidt	2003).	
Most	of	the	corresponding	accounts	would	likely	agree	with	Eric	Uslaner’s	general	claim	that	
“the	roots	of	trust	are	not	institutional”	(2003,	173).
Meanwhile,	 other	 theorists	 have	 stressed	 that	 social	 capital	 depends	 on	 its	 institutional	
framework	and	should	therefore	be	treated	as	an	endogenous	variable	(Freitag	2006;	Jackman	
and	Miller	 2004;	 Letki	 2006;	Newton	 2006;	 Radnitz,	Wheatley,	 and	Zürcher	 2009;	 Rothstein	
and	Stolle	2008,	34).	In	this	somewhat	Hobbesian	view,	political	institutions	in	place	are	seen	
as	a	sine qua non	for	social	interaction,	which	then	generates	social	capital	endowments:	only	
states	 create	 the	 environment	 in	 which	 actors	 can	 prosperously	 cooperate.	 Especially	 the	
new	economic	institutionalism	(cp.	Coase	1937;	Williamson	1975)	regards	the	enforcement	of	
property	rights	as	crucial	for	the	trust	necessary	for	(market)	interactions	(cp.	e.g.	Arrow	1972,	
357;	Freitag	2006,	138;	Fukuyama	2005,	43;	Levi	1996,	51).
Adapting	 Ostrom	 and	 Ahn’s	 concept	 of	 social	 capital	 as	 consisting	 of	 three	 dimensions	 –	
trustworthiness,	 social	networks,	 and	 institutions	 (Ahn	and	Ostrom	2008;	2003)	–	 this	paper	
positions	itself	on	the	middle	ground	between	the	“culturalists”	and	“institutionalists.”	Social	
capital	and	 institutions	are	seen	as	partially	 interdependent	 (regarding	 the	 interdependence	
between	 democratic	 institutions	 and	 social	 capital,	 see	 Paxton	 2002).	 My	 point	 of	 view	 is	
somewhat	 similar	 to	Granovetter’s	 work	 on	 the	 reciprocal	 relationship	 between	 small-scale	
interactions	 and	 large-scale	 social	 patterns	 (Granovetter	 1973).	 Although	 the	 provision	 of	
governance	facilitated	by	social	capital	certainly	entails	various	feedback	loops,	social	capital	
includes	 further	 norms	 and	 networks	 that	 cannot	 sufficiently	 be	 understood	 as	merely	 the	
outcomes	of	governance.	These	sources	of	social	capital	are	independent	of	the	provision	of	
governance	in	place.	Thus,	it	does	not	seem	redundant	to	use	social	capital	as	an	explaining	
variable	despite	its	partially	endogenous	character.	While	the	relationship	between	social	capital	
and	governance	is	generally	seen	as	interdependent,	this	paper	limits	itself	to	analyzing	the	role	
that	social	capital	plays	for	the	provision	of	governance	(regardless	of	existing	feedback	loops).
What Has Not Been Done?
Social	capital	theory	has	previously	been	applied	to	social	processes	outside	the	OECD	context.	
Some	authors	have	drawn	a	connection	between	social	capital,	as	a	dimension	of	the	broader	
concept	 of	 social	 cohesion,	 and	 violent	 conflict	 (see	 Brinkerhoff	 and	 Brinkerhoff	 2002,	 518;	
Colletta	and	Cullen	2000,	12ff.).	Brinkerhoff	and	Mayfield,	for	example,	argue	that	social	capital	
has	played	an	important	role	in	post-war	state	building	in	Iraq	(2005).	Interpersonal	trust	as	
an	 outcome	of	 social	 capital	 has	 been	 linked	 to	 interethnic	 cooperation	 (Fearon	 and	Laitin	
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1996;	see	also	Pickering	2006)	and	to	development	and	poverty	reduction	in	general	 (see	e.g.	
Baliamoune-Lutz	and	Mavrotas	2009;	Fukuyama	2001;	Krishna	2002;	Narayan	1999;	Richards,	
Bah,	and	Vincent	2004;	Woolcock	1998;	Woolcock	and	Narayan	2000;	World	Bank	2011).	Social	
capital	has	also	been	linked	to	(post-Soviet)	democratic	transitions	(Adam	2007;	Badescu	and	
Uslaner	 2003;	 Kaminska	 2010;	 Roßteutscher	 2010)	 and	 to	 governance	 in	 communities	 that	
“can	sometimes	do	what	governments	and	markets	fail	to	do	because	their	members,	but	not	
outsiders,	have	crucial	 information	about	other	members’	behaviours,	capacities,	and	needs”	
(Bowles	and	Gintis	2002,	423).	However,	these	accounts	have	not	addressed	the	general	puzzle	
of	governance	without	the	state:
Under	which	conditions	is	social	coordination	possible	in	the	absence	of	strong	state	institutions	
and	their	shadows?
That	it	is	possible	at	all	seems	undisputed:	In	areas	of	limited	statehood,	decisions	and	rules	
are	enforced	(see	e.g.	Raeymaekers	2010)	and	public	goods	provided	(Menkhaus	2007)	by	non-
state	 actors,	 for	 instance	 in	 the	 field	 of	 security	 (cp.	 Baker	 2002).	 The	 following	 examples	
further	illustrate	some	of	the	empirical	findings	for	governance	in	the	absence	of	statehood.	
Governance	structures	include	
„state	 actors	 such	 as	 higher	 and	 lower	 echelon	 bureaucrats,	 political	 parties,	
customary	 authorities,	 professional	 associations,	 trade	 unions,	 neighbourhood	
and	 self-help	 organizations,	 social	 movements,	 national	 and	 international	
NGOs,	 churches	 and	 religious	 movements,	 but	 also	 guerillas,	 warlords,	 ‚big	
men,‘	 businessmen,	 multinational	 corporations,	 regional	 and	 international	
(government)	institutions	and	foreign	states“	(Hagmann/Péclard	2010,	546f.).
A	concrete	example	of	their	engagement	is	provided	by	Raeymaekers,	who	outlines	his	empirical	
findings	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo.	In	terms	of	non-state	governance,	he	cites
„Butembo’s	businessmen	in	the	performance	of	several	‚state-like‘	functions,	such	
as	 the	financing	of	schools	and	hospitals,	 the	construction	and	maintenance	of	
roads	and	bridges,	the	provision	of	local	electricity,	and	even	the	construction	of	a	
local	airport.	This	non-state	governance	often	included	the	direct	transfer	of	state	
authority	to	private	bodies,	in	a	process	one	could	describe	as	‚governance	without	
government‘	”	(Raeymaekers	2010,	547).
Raeymaekers	concludes	that	
„state	collapse	does	not	necessarily	have	to	be	associated	with	the	end	of	governance:	
despite	high	levels	of	insecurity	and	uncertainty,	people	continue	to	seek	answers	
to	the	intractable	problem	of	order	and	the	organization	of	political	life,	especially	
where	state	power	is	either	weak	or	(theoretically)	absent”	(2010,	580).
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Renders	and	Terlinden	provide	another	illustration	of	governance	in	the	absence	of	statehood,	
describing	the	situation	Somaliland:
„The	local	and	national	authorities	who	took	over	after	the	collapse	of	the	Somali	
regime	included	the	actors	of	war,	that	is	primarily	the	Somali	National	Movement	
(SNM),	a	number	of	smaller	clan	militia	groups	and	their	leaders.	But	they	also	
included	traditional	authorities,	religious	groups,	strong	businessmen,	remnants	
of	 the	former	state	administration	and,	not	 least,	 the	aspiring	new	government	
of	the	self-declared	republic.	Individually	and	collectively,	these	actors	exercised	
authority	in	various	ways“	(2010,	724).
As	stated	in	the	Introduction,	areas	of	limited	statehood,	though	often	seen	as	sanctuaries	of	
anarchy	and	conflict,	are	not	void	of	governance	structures	and	processes	–	but	circumscribed	
state	 institutions	 are	 bystanders	 rather	 than	 part	 of	 the	 governance	 solutions.	 Functions	
commonly	 associated	with	 the	OECD-style	 state	 are	 provided	 by	 various	 actors	 engaged	 in	
various	processes	of	coordination.	In	order	to	analytically	capture	who	(structure)	is	involved	
in	such	“functional	equivalents”	(Draude	2007)	and	how	(through	what	processes),	some	(e.g.,	
Sonderforschungsbereich	 700	 2005)	 have	 adapted	 the	 concept	 of	 “governance”	 from	 largely	
OECD-centered	 research	on	network-like	 forms	of	 coordination	 (Powell	 1990;	Scharpf	 1993)	
and	international	relations	theory	(Rosenau	and	Czempiel	1992).	In	this	context,	governance	(in	
areas	of	limited	statehood)	has	been	defined	as	institutionalized	modes	of	social	coordination	
to	produce	and	 implement	collectively	binding	rules,	or	 to	provide	collective	goods	 (see	e.g.	
Mayntz,	2009;	Risse,	2010).
Despite	rather	isolated	attempts	to	use	social	capital	to	explain	various	social	phenomena	out-
side	 the	OECD	context,	 social	capital	has	not	been	 linked	 to	governance	 in	areas	of	 limited	
statehood	thus	far.	This	is	striking,	for	linking	social	capital	to	“social	coordination	underly-
ing	governance	without	the	state”	offers	a	potential	way	to	address	the	puzzle	resulting	from	
governance	without	the	state.	Such	an	attempt	could	provide	further	insights	into	the	social	
conditions	that	influence	the	ability	of	governance	actors	to	solve	collective	action	problems	
associated	with	different	modes	of	coordination.	Before	discussing	potential	mechanisms	in	
further	detail,	however,	a	few	conceptual	clarifications	seem	necessary.
2.2 Conceptual Clarifications
2.2.1 Social Capital
Social	capital	as	defined	by	Elinor	Ostrom	and	T.	K.	Ahn	(2008;	2003)	is	well-suited	to	exploring	
collective	 action	 in	 relation	 to	 different	 modes	 of	 coordination.	 Social	 capital	 is	 generally	
understood	as	an	asset	of	individual	and	collective	actors	(cp.	Adler	and	Kwon	2002,	21).	It	can	
be	analyzed	on	different	levels	of	aggregation	(Jansen	2006,	32ff.).	Social	capital	results	from	the	
social	embeddedness	of	actors	(cp.	ibid.,	27)	and	can	broadly	be	seen	as	a	“set	of	prescriptions,	
values,	and	relationships	created	by	individuals	in	the	past	that	can	be	drawn	on	in	the	present	
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and	future	to	facilitate	overcoming	social	dilemmas”	(Ahn	and	Ostrom	2008,	73).	The	concept	
contains	 three	dimensions,	specified	as	 trustworthiness,	social networks,	 and	formal and informal 
rules or institutions	(ibid.,	73;	Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	xiv).	Social	capital	facilitates	collective	action	
when	these	three	dimensions	“enhance	trust	among	people	and,	thus,	breed	cooperation	in	a	
collective-action	situation”	(Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	xv;	cp.	also	Scharpf	1997,	137-8).	Trust	itself	
has	 long	 been	 associated	 with	 facilitating	market	 transactions	 and	 social	 interactions	 of	 all	
kinds	 (see	 e.g.	Braithwaite	 and	Levi	 1998;	 Fukuyama	 1996;	Gambetta	 1988;	Kramer	 and	Tyler	
1996;	Misztal	1996).	On	the	most	general	level,	trust	is	“a	solution	for	specific	problems	of	risk”	
(Luhmann	2000,	94).	Risk	undermines	cooperation	in	general	and	coordination	in	particular.	
In	 restraining	 actors	 from	 abandoning	 cooperation	 because	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 trust,	 social	 capital	
incorporates	 a	 “complex	 configuration	 of	 various	 factors”	 and	 determines	 “the	 success	 and	
failure	of	collective	action”	(Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	xvi).	In	his	work	on	“trust	networks,”	Charles	
Tilly	provides	illuminating	examples	in	which	interpersonal	trust	has	mattered	for	cooperative	
behavior,	including	“cohabitation,	procreation,	provision	for	children,	transmission	of	property,	
communication	with	supernatural	forces,	joint	control	of	agricultural	resources,	long-distance	
trade,	protection	 from	predators,	maintenance	of	health,	 and	collective	 response	 to	disaster”	
(Tilly	2004,	13).	“Trusting	someone”	essentially	refers	to	an	actor’s	belief	in	the	trustworthiness	
of	others	(Ahn	and	Ostrom	2008,	72;	Gambetta	1988,	217-218;	cp.	also	Scharpf	1997,	138).	Game-
theoretic	models	best	exemplify	how	trust	increases	cooperation.	Taking	the	Prisoner’s	Dilemma	
as	an	archetypical	collective	action	situation,	cooperation	pays	off	for	both	players	–	although	it	
is	not	their	dominant	strategy.	However,	trust	changes	the	actors’	strategies	and	consequently	
the	outcome	of	the	game:	if	both	actors	believe	in	the	trustworthiness	of	the	other,	both	actors	
are	more	likely	to	cooperate	and	ultimately	profit	from	cooperation.
So-called	 “trust	 games”	 (cp.	 Ahn	 and	 Ostrom	 2008,	 81)	 are	 similarly	 good	 examples.	 These	
are	 game	 theoretical	 situations	 in	which	 one	 actor	 first	 decides	 about	 an	 investment,	 while	
the	ultimate	 outcome	depends	 on	 another	 actor’s	 subsequent	decision	 to	 reciprocate	 or	not	
(Chapter	3.3	will	discuss	this	in	more	detail).	Social	capital	endowments	matter	for	the	action	of	
all	actors	involved:	“The	three	forms	of	social	capital	we	propose	–	trustworthiness	of	people,	
social	networks,	and	institutions	–	are	three	primary	reasons	for	a	Trustee	to	behave	reciprocally,	
as	well	as	for	a	Truster	to	believe	that	the	Trustee	would	reciprocate”	(Ahn	and	Ostrom	2008,	82).	
The	following	section	will	further	elaborate	on	the	underlying	mechanisms.
Figure 1: Dimensions of Social Capital
Networks
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Trustworthiness
A	trustee	is	trustworthy	if	he	exercises	a	preference	to	reciprocate.	While	preferences	depend	on	
the	particular	incentive	structure,	they	are	not	solely	the	product	of	selfish,	utility-maximizing	
behavior.	Preferences	also	depend	on	culture,	values,	and	social	norms	 (cp.	Fukuyama	1996).	
Trustworthiness	 is	 thus	 linked	 to	 the	 “logic	 of	 consequence”	 as	 well	 as	 to	 the	 “logic	 of	
appropriateness”	 (cp.	March	and	Olsen	 1998).	Ahn	and	Ostrom	place	 trustworthiness	 in	 the	
framework	of	“second-generation	collective-action	theories,”	which	“acknowledge	the	existence	
of	multiple	types	of	individuals	as	a	core	principle	of	modelling	human	behaviour”	(Ahn	and	
Ostrom	2008,	79;	see	also	Ostrom	1998).	I	will	follow	this	meta-theoretical	approach,	viewing	
trustworthiness	neither	as	the	outcome	of	purely	utility-maximizing	strategies	nor	as	something	
entirely	distinct	from	utility-maximizing	reasoning.	Important	is	that	social	factors	feed	into	
the	individual’s	choice	to	reciprocate	or	not,	and	they	do	so	in	the	form	of	trustworthiness.
Social Networks
Social	networks	 increase	 interpersonal	 trust	by	providing	 information	 (cp.	Granovetter	1973)	
about	an	actor’s	past	behavior,	especially	about	past	opportunism	(see	also	Milgrom,	North,	and	
Weingast	1990).	Since	social	networks	consist	of	repetitive	social	interactions,	they	also	change	
actors’	 incentive	 structures	 by	 increasing	 the	 role	 of	 anticipation	 of	 future	 interactions	 (cp.	
Axelrod	1981).	Ahn	and	Ostrom	elaborate:	“The	Trustee	embedded	in	a	network	…	knows	that	it	
is	in	her	interest	not	to	exploit,	but	to	reciprocate	and	to	keep	the	relationship	going.	Following	
a	reciprocal	course	of	action	would	generate	a	stream	of	income	into	the	future,	which	is	greater	
than	the	gains	from	immediate	exploitation”	(Ahn	and	Ostrom	2008,	83).	Networks	generally	play	
an	important	role	in	knowledge	transfers	(see	e.g.	Djelic	2004;	Inkpen	and	Tsang	2005),	which	
are	 important	 factors	 of	 coordination.	Coleman	gives	 an	 example	 of	 the	network–collective	
action	mechanism	 in	 reference	 to	 the	 behavior	 of	 buyers	 and	 sellers	 in	 London’s	 diamond	
district	(which	he	adopts	from	Wechsberg):	
„Men	walk	 around	Hatton	Garden	with	 a	 hundred	 thousand	 pounds	worth	 of	
diamonds	that	were	handed	over	to	them	in	trust.	In	a	dingy	office	a	man	shows	
another	man	a	number	of	stones	that	cost	him	a	fortune,	and	then	goes	away	while	
the	 buyer	 inspects	 them	 carefully.	 No	 contracts	 are	 made.	 Nothing	 is	 written	
down.	All	deals	are	settled	verbally”	(Wechsberg	1966,	p.	83).	The	high	level	of	trust	
manifested	here	stems	from	the	fact	that	“the	reputation	for	trustworthiness	is	of	
central	 importance	 ...	 because	 that	 reputation	 is	 quickly	 communicated	 among	
all	 those	 on	 whom	 the	 trustee	 depends	 for	 future	 business,	 that	 is,	 for	 future	
placement	of	trust“	(Coleman	1990,	109;	see	also	Jackman	and	Miller	1998,	53).
Here,	 the	 social	network	 (as	 a	dimension	of	 social	 capital)	 effectively	 transmits	 information	
about	 actors’	 behavior	 (i.e.,	 reputation)	within	 the	group	of	businessmen	and	 thus	 supports	
trustworthiness;	this,	in	turn,	ensures	that	agreements	are	kept,	since	defection	would	cost	the	
dealers	a	fortune.
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Formal and Informal Institutions
Following	North,	 institutions	 regulate	 social	 behavior	 (1990).	 In	doing	 so,	 they	 largely	 affect	
interpersonal	 trust	–	 especially	 as	 formal	 institutions,	often	within	 legal	 systems	 (cp.	Stoker	
1998,	 17).	They	 include	sanctions	 for	opportunistic	behavior:	“Effective	 laws	and	rules	create	
mechanisms	that	may	reliably	generate	information	and/or	reliably	punish	exploitation of	others	
in	a	given	trust	situation	and	thus	increase	the	likelihood	of	collective	action”	(Ahn	and	Ostrom	
2008,	84;	cp.	Levi	1996).	However,	such	(formal)	institutions	are	often	absent	in	areas	of	limited	
statehood.	While	some	scholars	have	seen	social	capital’s	relationship	to	formal	institutions	as	
analytically	problematic	in	the	absence	of	statehood	(cp.	e.g.	Börzel	2007,	55),	the	social	capital	
concept	used	here	is	broader.	It	includes	other	institutional	factors	that	cannot	be	subsumed	
under	 formal	 institutions,	 for	 example	 informal	 institutions,	 international	 standards,	 and	
custom	 and	 convention	 (cp.	 Jensen	 2008).	 It	 entails	 first	 and	 foremost	 institutions	 that	 are	
independent	of	state	institutions,	which	by	definition	are	missing	in	areas	of	limited	statehood.	
Moreover,	while	areas	of	limited	statehood	are	not	void	of	institutions	that	regulate	behavior,	
these	often	cannot	be	categorized	as	either	formal	or	informal	(cp.	e.g.	Renders	and	Terlinden	
2010,	726).	Even	if	this	were	resolved	analytically,	as	Renders	and	Terlinden	state,	“one	could	even	
argue	that	the	exact	definition	of	these	boundaries	would	anyhow	be	more	or	less	irrelevant,	
because	they	are	so	porous”	(ibid.).
All	three	dimensions	of	social	capital	–	trustworthiness,	networks,	and	institutions	–	increase	
trustworthy	behavior	and	lead	to	higher	levels	of	trust	(see	Ahn	and	Ostrom	2008;	2003).	How-
ever,	they	are	far	from	being	determinants	of	the	trustee’s	behavior:	Given	high	levels	of	social	
capital	endowments,	trustees	can	still	behave	opportunistically.	This	might	occur	if	the	relevant	
incentives	are	strong	enough.	Thus,	it	is	not	surprising	that	a	lot	of	the	related	mechanisms	
have	been	observed	empirically	on	 the	aggregate	 level	but	not	necessarily	on	 the	 individual	
level	(see	e.g.	the	analysis	of	social	capital	and	democracy	by	Newton	2006).	Social	capital	should	
rather	be	seen	as	a	condition	that	increases	but	does	not	determine	causally	collective	action.
2.2.2 Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood
While	the	concepts	of	“governance”	and	“areas	of	limited	statehood”	have	been	extensively	in-
troduced	and	defined	elsewhere	and	in	this	paper,	this	section	summarizes	the	main	points	and	
interprets	governance	for	the	first	time	as	a	“game.”
Areas	of	limited	statehood	can	be	found	in	states	where	governments	“lack	the	ability	to	im-
plement	and	enforce	rules	and	decisions	or	in	which	the	legitimate	monopoly	over	the	means	
of	violence	is	lacking,	or	both”	(Börzel	and	Risse	2010,	118-9;	cp.	Sonderforschungsbereich	700	
2009,	 10).	The	 absence	 of	 a	 hierarchically	 enforced	 legal	 environment	 conducive	 to	 solving	
collective	action	dilemmas	raises	the	question:	Under	what	conditions	does	the	necessary	social	
coordination	to	provide	governance	take	place?	In	this	context,	governance	is	understood	as	
institutionalized	modes	of	social	coordination	to	produce	and	implement	collectively	binding	
rules,	 or	 to	 provide	 collective	 goods	 (see	 e.g.	Mayntz	 2009;	 Risse	 2010).	 Social	 coordination	
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generally	takes	place	along	the	continuum	between	more	institutionalized,	hierarchical	modes	
of	coordination	on	the	one	end	and	“anarchic	fields”	on	the	other,	where	only	unilateral	action	
is	possible	(Scharpf	1997,	97ff.).	The	following	chapters	focus	on	two	ideal-typical	modes,	namely	
hierarchical	and	non-hierarchical	coordination	among	different	kinds	of	(collective)	actors	(cp.	
Sonderforschungsbereich	700	2009,	17,	24).	Both	“modes”	of	interaction	have	been	empirically	
observed	independent	of	state	institutions.
In	order	to	conceptually	strip	away	the	state-centered	bias	in	much	of	the	governance	research,	
reflected	in	the	widely	used	state/non-state	dichotomy	(cp.	Draude	2007;	Risse	and	Lehmkuhl	
2007,	26),	the	state	will	merely	be	interpreted	as	one	actor	among	others.	States	interact	with	
various	other	actors	hierarchically	(e.g.,	by	hierarchically	steering	when	its	capacity	to	enforce	
decisions	 is	 not	 circumscribed)	 as	 well	 as	 horizontally	 (e.g.,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 public-private-
partnerships).	Hierarchical	coordination,	can	also	be	found	on	different	sub-state	levels	(e.g.,	
Menkhaus	 2008),	 in	 international	 protectorates	 (Risse	 and	 Lehmkuhl	 2007,	 18),	 and	 in	 the	
colonial	administrations	of	earlier	times	(ibid.).
Horizontal	coordination	can	often	be	observed	where	negotiation	is	necessary	for	the	collective	
provision	of	governance.	Renders	and	Terlinden	exemplify	this	in	reference	to	the	formation	
of	sub-state	statehood	in	Somaliland:	“The	evolution	of	Somaliland’s	statehood	must	be	under-
stood	as	a	parallel	process	of	negotiation	between	state-associated	and	clan-associated	political	
actors	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	national	centre	and	the	clan-based	constituencies	on	the	other	
hand”	(Renders	and	Terlinden	2010,	727).
The Governance Game
Actors	with	incentives	to	provide	governance	have	to	coordinate	their	behavior	(e.g.,	when	set-
ting	up	community	councils	to	regulate	societal	issues).	However,	engaging	in	the	provision	of	
governance	is	associated	with	various	costs	to	the	actors	involved.	Governance	as	a	collective	
good	makes	so-called	“free-riding”	and	opportunism	generally	attractive.	In	consequence,	coor-
dination	processes	are	generally	burdened	by	well-known	collective	action	problems,	in	which	
actors	face	the	challenge	“of	overcoming	selfish	incentives	and	achieving	mutually	beneficial	
cooperative	ways	of	getting	things	done”	(Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	xiv).
Although	this	paper	will	not	generate	formal	game-theoretic	models,	the	provision	of	gover-
nance	can	be	cast	in	game-theoretic	language:	Governance	provision	is	the	outcome	of	success-
fully	played	collective	action	games,	 in	which	different	 (collective)	actors	need	 to	coordinate	
their	 behavior	 when	 setting	 binding	 rules	 (e.g.,	 agreements)	 and	 administrating/organizing	
(e.g.,	financing).	In	order	to	engage	in	the	provision	of	governance,	actors	need	to	have	trust	in	
other	actors’	communicated	intentions	to	engage	and	not	to	act	opportunistically.	Games	are	
generally	qualified	by	multiple	players,	each	of	which	“has	a	set	of	alternative	choices	governed	
by	the	rules	of	the	game;	s/he	can	select	a	strategy	(a	plan	of	her/his	sequential	choices	or	moves)	
to	arrive	at	the	outcome	of	the	game.”	(Scharle	2002,	236)	Governance	games	may	vary,	for	they	
take	place	in	different	“institutional	environments”	(North	1990,	3).
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Actors in the Governance Game
The	collective	action	theory	has	traditionally	conceptualized	actors	as	purely	utility-maximizing	
in	the	narrow	sense	–	as	“rational”	(e.g.,	Hardin	1968;	Olson	1965a,	1965b).	The	“core	of	the	first-
generation	 theories	 of	 collective	 action	 is	 an	 image	 of	 atomized,	 selfish,	 and	 fully	 rational	
individuals”	according	to	Ostrom	and	Ahn	(2003,	xv).	Corresponding	“first-generation”	research	
often	argues	that	collective	action	is	not	 likely	 to	occur,	even	though	its	outcome	may	be	 in	
the	 best	 interest	 of	 the	 actors	 involved.	However,	 empirical	 research	 (often	 associated	 with	
behavioral	and	evolutionary	game	theory)	has	provided	other	results,	as	Elinor	Ostrom	notes:
„After	all,	many	people	vote,	do	not	cheat	on	their	taxes,	and	contribute	effort	to	
voluntary	association.	Extensive	fieldwork	has	by	now	established	that	individuals	
in	all	walks	of	life	and	all	parts	of	the	world	voluntarily	organize	themselves	so	
as	to	gain	the	benefits	of	trade,	to	provide	mutual	protection	against	risk,	and	to	
create	and	enforce	rules	that	protect	natural	resources“	(2000,	137-138).
Other	accounts	have	concluded	that	there	are	multiple	types	of	actors	(cp.	Ostrom	1998;		also	
Scharpf	1993,	151)	with	preferences	that	are	endogenous	(cp.	Güth	and	Kliemt	1998).	“Second-
generation	 collective-action	 theories”	 (see	 Ostrom	 and	 Ahn	 2003,	 xivf.)	 enable	 research	
to	 conceptualize	 actors	 and	 their	 behavior	 as	 dependent	 upon	 social	 capital	 in	 the	 form	of	
institutions,	norms,	and	networks.	These	theories	include	actors	who	follow	March	and	Olsen’s	
“logic	of	consequence”	and	the	“logic	of	appropriateness”	(1998).
This	theoretical	framework	also	enables	research	to	investigate	micro–macro	linkages	between	
social	 conditions	 and	 governance	 through	 social	 capital	 in	 collective	 action	 settings.	 It	 can	
therefore	be	used	to	address	the	puzzle	raised	by	the	observation,	“that	citizens	in	some	countries,	
regions,	cities	or	villages	are	able	to	trust	each	other	and	thereby	solve	many	of	their	collective	
action	problems	while	others	are	not,	[which]	turns	out	to	be	one	of	the	most	interesting	puzzles	
in	the	social	sciences”	(Krishna	2002;	see	also	Ostrom	1990;	Rothstein	and	Stolle	2008,	4).
Social	capital	fulfils	a	similar	role	for	actors’	behavior	as	institutions	in	Scharpf ’s	actor-centered	
institutionalism:
„Once	we	know	the	institutional	setting	of	interaction,	we	know	a	good	deal	about	
the	actors	involved,	about	their	options,	and	about	their	perceptions	and	preferences.	
An	institutionalist	framework,	in	other	words,	provides	a	halfway	position	between	
a	 theoretical	 system	 that,	 like	 neoclassical	 economics,	 substitutes	 universal	 and	
standardized	assumptions	for	empirical	information	on	the	one	hand	and	purely	
descriptive	studies	of	individual	cases	on	the	other“	(Scharpf	1997,	41).
„Although	institutions	constitute	composite	actors,	create	and	constrain	options,	
and	shape	perceptions	and	preferences,	they	cannot	influence	choices	and	outcomes	
in	 a	 deterministic	 sense.	 Institutionalized	 rules,	 even	 if	 they	 are	 completely	
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effective,	 will	 rarely	 prescribe	 one	 and	 only	 one	 course	 of	 action.	 Instead,	 by	
proscribing	 some	 and	permitting	 other	 actions,	 they	will	 define	 repertoires	 of	
more	or	less	acceptable	courses	of	action	that	will	leave	considerable	scope	for	the	
strategic	and	tactical	choices	of	purposeful	actors“	(Scharpf	1997,	42).
Different	types	and	endowments	of	social	capital	affect	the	choices	made	by	actors,	but	they	do	
not	determine	micro-behavior	in	the	strict	causal	sense.	In	short,	social	capital	does	not	pro-
hibit	actors	from	exercising	opportunism,	but	it	facilitates	trust	amongst	actors	and	changes	
the	way	they	play	the	governance	game.	In	short,	social	capital	is	of	structural	origin	and	has	
structural	consequences	–	without	neglecting	agency.
2.3 Social Capital and Action 
Social	capital	affects	the	logic	of	expected	“consequences,”	of	“appropriateness,”	and	of	“arguing”	
(March	and	Olsen	1998;	Risse	2000),	which	are	ideal	types	as	“interpretations”	of	action	(March	
and	Olsen	1998,	949).	According	to	the	logic	of	consequence,	actions	are	“‘explained’	by	identifying	
consequential	reasons	for	them”	(March	and	Olsen	1998,	950).	This	logic	follows	from	the	idea	
that	“action	by	individuals,	organizations,	or	states	is	driven	by	calculation	of	its	consequences	as	
measured	against	prior	preferences”	(ibid.).	In	this	context,	social	capital	may	be	a	reason	within	
a	utility-maximizing	strategy	to	act	in	a	trustworthy	way,	as	the	following	quote	by	Jackman	and	
Miller	demonstrates:	“the	structure	of	 the	situation	 (i.e.	 the	 large	 long-term	costs	associated	
with	a	short-term	breach	of	trust)	creates	incentives	for	individuals	to	be	trustworthy”	(1998,	53).	
Thus,	social	capital	can	be	seen	within	an	expected-utility	framework.	Ostrom,	Ahn,	and	others	
have	convincingly	argued,	however,	that	in	the	rather	dogmatic	rational	choice	view,	“trust	and	
trustworthiness	are	redundant	concepts	that	can	be	readily	explained	away	by	incentives	and	
their	behavioral	effects	on	self-interested	actors”	(Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003).	Opposing	this	point	
of	view,	they	conclude:	“It	is	essential	to	couple	social	capital	to	the	second-generation	theories	
of	collective	action	that	regard	heterogeneous	preferences	seriously”	 (Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	
xvi).	This	 “motivational	 heterogeneity	 implies	 that	 individuals	 differ	 in	 regard	 to	 values	 or	
social	orientations”	(Ahn,	Ostrom,	and	Walker	2003,	295).
This	view	refers	to	the	logic	of	appropriateness,	according	to	which	“action	involves	evoking	
an	identity	or	role	and	matching	the	obligations	of	that	identity	or	role	to	a	specific	situation”	
(March	and	Olsen	1998,	951).	Social	capital	can	be	associated	with	this	logic	because	it	consists	
of	social	institutions	similar	to	the	“rules	and	practices	that	are	socially	constructed,	publicly	
known,	anticipated,	and	accepted”	(March	and	Olsen	1998,	952).	The	logic	of	appropriateness	
becomes	relevant	as	soon	as	“strong	trust”	results	from	social	capital.	Following	Scharpf,	
„[S]trong	trust	implies	the	expectation that alter	[the	other]	will avoid strategy options 
attractive to itself that would seriously hurt ego’s interests	and	that	in	case	of	need	help	
can	be	counted	on	even	if	 it	entails	considerable	cost	 to	the	helper.	 In	terms	of	
the	 mixed-motive	 games	 discussed	 earlier,	 the	 implication	 is	 that	 exploitative	
strategies	will	not	be	used,	and	hence	need	not	be	guarded	against,	in	the	Prisoner’s	
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Dilemma	and	in	Chicken	games.	In	other	words,	strong	trust	can	be	equated	with	
some	degree	of	a	solidaristic	interaction	orientation“	(1997,	138).
Socially	constructed	identities	and	endogenous	preferences,	which	lie	at	the	heart	of	the	logic	
of	appropriateness,	derive	from	the	social	embeddedness	of	actors,	which	is	–	at	least	to	a	cer-
tain	degree	–	a	synonym	for	social	capital.
However,	social	capital	also	relates	to	the	communicative	aspects	of	social	interaction:	Within	
social	interactions,	trustworthiness	implies	the	“expectation	that	information	communicated	
about	alter‘s	own	options	and	preferences	will	be	truthful,	rather	than	purposefully	misleading,	
and	that	commitments	explicitly	entered	will	be	honored	as	long	as	the	circumstances	under	
which	they	were	entered	do	not	change	significantly”	(Scharpf	1997,	137).
Social	 capital	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 enhancing	 trust	 necessary	 for	 communicative	 action,	which	 is	
linked	to	the	“logic	of	arguing”	(Risse	2000).	It	 increases	the	trustful	relationships	that	are	a	
prerequisite	for	successful	arguing	(Habermas	1992).	Speakers	have	to	trust	the	authenticity	of	
their	correspondents	(Risse	2000,	10)	–	or	according	to	Hobbes:	we	trust	in	the	speaker	“whose	
word	we	take”	(1651	[1986],	130).	Moreover,	social	structures	embodied	in	social	capital	relate	to	a	
“common	[social]	lifeworld,”	which	is	another	precondition	for	communicative	action	(Haber-
mas	1992;	Risse	2000,	10).	This	might	be	case	when	“trust	networks”	are	built	upon	similar	ex-
periences	of	migration,	for	example	(Tilly	2004,	52ff.).
Far	from	being	conclusive,	this	section	aimed	at	tentatively	sketching	a	few	arguments	for	the	far-
reaching	influence	of	social	capital	on	action	in	general	and	interaction	in	particular.	From	the	
rational	choice	perspective,	social	capital	is	incorporated	into	functions	of	expected	outcomes,	
able	to	alter	actors’	choices	within	the	governance	game.	At	the	same	time,	social	capital	captures	
factors	that	influence	action	according	to	the	logic	of	appropriateness,	for	example	by	including	
norms	of	reciprocity,	informal	institutions,	and	rules	and	practices	diffused	in	social	networks.	
Finally,	social	capital	facilitates	communicative	action	by	increasing	interpersonal	trust	–	a	sine 
qua non for	the	“logic	of	arguing”.	If	actors	were	to	always	be	cautious	because	of	a	fundamental	
uncertainty	about	the	truthful	intentions	of	others,	“they	would	destroy	all	opportunities	for	
social	 cooperation	 and	 profitable	 exchange”	 (Scharpf	 1993,	 149;	 see	 also	 Luhmann	 2000).	As	
Scharpf	infers,	“there	is	thus	a	huge	premium	on	the	capacity	for	trustworthy	communications	
and	commitments	among	interdependent	actors.”	He	adds	elsewhere	that	“the	successful	joint	
search	 for	 better	 overall	 solutions	 requires	 creativity,	 effective	 communication,	 and	mutual	
trust”	(Scharpf	1997,	124;	cp.	also	Risse	2000,	21)	.
The	general	 aim	of	 this	 chapter	was	 to	 further	 the	understanding	of	how	 social	 conditions	
affect	 the	 capacity	 of	 different	 (collective)	 actors	 to	 successfully	 play	 the	 governance	 game.	
“Conditions”	are	understood	as	 (structural)	 factors	 influencing	actors’	behavior	and	thus	the	
performance	and	outcomes	of	governance	processes.	They	are	not	causal	explanations:	they	may	
be	necessary	but	are	certainly	not	sufficient in	explaining	(inter)action.	Various	other	factors	play	
equally	important	roles	and	may	even	degrade	the	social	conditions	of	the	processes	to	minor	
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factors.	Social	conditions	do	not	directly	relate	to	the	intention	of	different	actors	to	engage	in	
governance	processes;	 this	 intention	is	often	motivated	by	“risks	of	anarchy”	and	“externally	
generated	shadows	of	hierarchies	by	international	organizations	or	other	states	as	well	as	market	
pressures	or	community	norms	that	induce	non-state	actors	to	participate	in	governance	and	
the	provision	of	common	goods”	(Börzel	and	Risse	2010,	126-7).	Social	conditions	in	the	form	of	
social	capital	relate	to	how	actors	engage	and	not	whether they engage.
3. Social Capital in the Governance Game
This	chapter	links	different	types	of	social	capital	to	the	facilitation	of	social	coordination	within	
the	governance	game	in	the	absence	of	statehood.	The	previous	chapter	has	already	introduced	
social	capital	as	a	facilitating	factor	for	collective	action	in	general,	primarily	by	increasing	trust	
among	the	actors.	The	process	dimension	of	governance	–“modes	of	coordination”–	has	been	
associated	with	the	collective	action	problem.	This	chapter	aims	to	link	different	types	of	social	
capital	to	different	modes	of	coordination	within	the	governance	game	and	introduce	what	I	
will	call	“clustered	coordination.”
Modes of Coordination
Three	ideal-type	categories	of	coordination	have	previously	been	identified:	While	economists	
have	 often	 conceptually	 grasped	 them	 as	 “hierarchies,”	 “markets,”	 and	 “networks”	 (see	 e.g.	
Powell	 1990),	 much	 of	 the	 governance	 literature	 simply	 conceptualizes	 them	 in	 a	 binary	
way	 as	 “hierarchical”	 and	 “non-hierarchical/horizontal”	 (the	 latter	 containing	 both	markets	
and	 networks).	 Charles	Tilly	 has	 introduced	 another	 terminology	 that	 is	 particularly	 useful	
for	the	analysis	of	governance	without	the	state	and	will	also	be	referred	to	in	the	following	
sections:	“Humans	have	repeatedly	devised	three	different	ways	of	creating	collective	benefits:	
authoritative	 organizations,	 collaborative	 institutions,	 and	 trust	 networks”	 (Tilly	 2004,	 38).	
According	to	Tilly,	they	all	rely	to	a	different	extent	on	“coercion,”	“capital,”	or	“commitment”	
(Tilly	2004,	30;	see	also	Tilly	2004,	45).	I	argue	that	“commitment”	broadly	reflects	the	essential	
idea	of	social	capital.	Tilly	defines	it	as	
„means	 relations	 among	 social	 sites	 (persons,	 groups,	 structures,	 or	 positions)	
that	promote	their	 taking	account	of	each	other.	Shared	language,	 for	 instance,	
powerfully	 links	 social	 sites	 without	 any	 necessary	 deployment	 of	 coercion	 or	
capital.	Commitment’s	local	organization	varies	as	dramatically	as	do	structures	
of	 coercion	 and	 capital.	Commitments	 can	 take	 the	 form	of	 shared	 religion	or	
ethnicity,	 trading	 ties,	 work-generated	 solidarities,	 communities	 of	 taste,	 and	
much	more.	To	 the	extent	 that	 commitments	of	 these	 sorts	 connect	 rulers	 and	
ruled,	they	substitute	partially	for	coercion	and	capital“	(2004,	31).
Institutionalized	 modes	 of	 social	 coordination	 are	 independent	 of	 the	 state/non-state	
dichotomy	 often	 used	 in	 the	 governance	 literature	 (cp.	 Boege,	 Brown,	 and	 Clements	 2009;	
Draude	2007;	Risse	and	Lehmkuhl	2007,	26f.).	Using	these	“modes”	makes	it	possible	to	analyze	
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how	different	actors	coordinate	the	provision	of	governance	–	without	referring	to	the	status	
of	actors	within	the	political	system	(cp.	Risse	and	Lehmkuhl	2007,	27).	Different	actors	can	be	
engaged	in	different	types	of	coordination	simultaneously.	State	institutions,	for	instance,	may	
utilize	their	means	for	coercion	within	hierarchical	structures,	while	at	the	same	time	being	
part	of	horizontal	collaborative	institutions,	for	example	in	form	of	PPPs,	and	participating	in	
trust	networks	(e.g.,	within	neo-patrimonial	structures	or	clientelistic	networks;	cp.	Jamal	2007).
3.1 Hierarchical Coordination 
„If	 a	Covenant	be	made,	wherein	neither	of	 the	parties	performe	presently,	but	
trust	one	another;	in	the	condition	of	meer	Nature,	(which	is	a	condition	of	Warre	
of	every	man	against	every	man,)	upon	any	reasonable	suspition,	it	is	Voyd:	But	if	
there	be	a	common	Power	set	over	them	both,	with	right	and	force	sufficient	to	
compel	performance;	it	is	not	Voyd.	For	he	that	performeth	first,	has	no	assurance	
the	other	will	performe	after;	because	the	bonds	of	words	are	too	weak	to	bridle	
mens	 ambition,	 avarice,	 anger,	 and	 other	 Passions,	 without	 the	 feare	 of	 some	
coercive	power“	(Hobbes	1651	[1986],	196).
States	 depend	 on	 hierarchies,	 but	 hierarchies	 do	 not	 depend	 on	 states.	 Areas	 of	 limited	
statehood	 are	not	 void	 of	 hierarchical	 coordination.	This	 includes	“shadows	 of	 hierarchical	
authority”	 (Scharpf	1993,	13;	cp.	Börzel	and	Risse	2010),	as	capable	as	hierarchies	of	changing	
actors’	preferences.	While	 the	 lack	of	domestic	 sovereignty	prohibits	 state	 institutions	 from	
hierarchically	 coordinating	 the	 provision	 of	 governance,	 “authoritative	 organizational	
principles”	(Tilly)	can	be	found	on	various	levels.	They	are	involved	in	the	provision	of	non-state	
governance,	 ranging	 from	hierarchical	 coordination	exercised	by	actors	 above	 the	 state	 (e.g.,	
international	protectorates	 in	Kosovo,	Afghanistan,	 and	 Iraq)	 to	 sub-state	governance	actors.	
The	former	are	functional	equivalents	of	states	in	that	they	include	many	state	functions	such	
as	 law	enforcement,	delivery	of	services,	and	coordination	of	 foreign	aid	 (cp.	e.g.	Reno	2008,	
143).	Tilly	names	“warlords,	landlords,	lineage	heads,	ethnic	leaders,	or	religious	magnates”	as	
hierarchical/authoritative	examples	on	the	sub-state	level	(2004,	35),	which	can	be	found	in	areas	
of	 limited	 statehood	as	well.	 Furthermore,	hierarchical	 coordination	can	occur	within	most	
conventional	organizations,	 including	business	firms,	 churches,	 and	households	 (Tilly	 2004,	
40).
Hierarchies	are	functional	solutions	to	the	problem	of	collective	action,	as	many	have	argued	
since	Hobbes	and	his	famous	quote	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter.	Incidents	of	hierarchical	
coordination	have	in	common	that	they	create	“collective	benefits	through	top-down	application	
of	incentives:	coercion,	capital,	and	commitment”	(Tilly	2004,	40).	They	may	form	“polities”	as	
well,	as	understood	by	Ferguson	and	Mansbach,	which	are	quite	distinct	from	the	Westphalian	
state	but	make	up	part	of	the	institutional	landscape	of	governance	in	areas	of	limited	statehood:	
“A	polity	(or	political	authority)	has	a	distinct	identity;	a	capacity	to	mobilize	persons	and	their	
resources	for	political	purposes	…	and	a	degree	of	institutionalization	and	hierarchy”	(1996,	34;	
cp.	Kassimir	2001,	94).
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Many	examples	of	hierarchical	coordination	in	areas	of	 limited	statehood	are	not	related	to	
the	comprehensive	governance	provision	in	consolidated	states:	They	are,	for	instance,	rarely	
capable	of	implementing	collectively	binding	rules	outside	their	confined	constituencies	and	
often	provide	“club	goods”	instead	of	inclusively	providing	“public	goods.”	Even	if	they	provide	
public	goods,	this	can	often	be	attributed	to	externalities	rather	than	to	the	intentional	provision	
of	governance	 (regarding	 the	 requirements	of	 intentionality,	 see	Risse	and	Lehmkuhl	2007).	
However,	these	cases	raise	the	fundamental	question	of	which	features	ultimately	distinguish	
the	 state	 from	other	organizational	 structures	 that	 act	 like	 (small	 and	circumscribed)	 states:	
states	also	provide	collective	goods	limited	to	defined	constituencies	(in	this	context,	citizen-
ship	can	be	interpreted	as	equivalent	to	membership).	One	example	is	the	case	of	Somaliland	
vs.	Somalia	(Menkhaus	2008).	
Hierarchical	organizations	that	provide	governance	can	be	categorized	along	the	governance	
continuum	spanning	between	the	most	and	least	inclusive	provision	of	governance	–	that	is,	
between	the	provision	of	goods	for	the	whole	society	(e.g.,	international	protectorates	in	Iraq	
and	Macedonia;	see	Risse	and	Lehmkuhl	2007,	18;	Reno	2008,	143)	and	exclusively	for	confined	
social	groups	(e.g.,	exclusive	clan-based	authorities	in	Somalia;	see	Menkhaus	2008).
This	 section	 argues	 that	 even	 though	 hierarchical	 coordination	 is	 a	 functional	 solution	 to	
collective	 action	 dilemmas	 in	 the	 Hobbesian	 perspective,	 it	 often	 requires	 a	 minimum	 of	
voluntary	cooperation.	This	cooperation,	as	it	will	be	argued,	is	linked	to	certain	social	capital	
endowments.	Hierarchical	coordination	can,	 in	a	Hobbesian	way,	be	 interpreted	as	a	 lack	of	
self-regulation:	“where	 there	 is	 not	 sufficient	 social	 capital	 for	 such	decentralized	 collective	
self-regulation,	 so	 that	hierarchy	 is	necessary”	 (Taylor	 1996,	 19;	 see	 also	 the	 argument	made	
by	Gellner	1990).	However,	this	does	not	imply	that	hierarchies	work	without	any	cooperative	
behavior.	Moreover,	charismatic	authority	resulting	in	hierarchies,	as	Coleman	argues,	can	be	
seen	as	a	lack	of	social	capital	as	well:	“It	appears,	in	fact,	to	be	precisely	the	desire	to	bring	into	
being	the	social	capital	needed	to	solve	common	problems	that	 leads	persons	under	certain	
circumstances	to	vest	authority	in	a	charismatic	leader”	(Coleman	1990,	313).
The	argument	stands	in	opposition	to	the	conventional	idea	that	states	holding	a	monopoly	on	
violence	are	able	to	effectively	enforce	rules	across	the	entire	territory	as	a	component	of	gover-
nance	provision	–	without	further	requirements	in	terms	of	cooperation.	I	argue,	however,	that	
hierarchical	coordination	without	any	voluntary	cooperation	is	unlikely	to	be	efficient	or	effec-
tive	(which	does	not	mean	that	every	actor	has	to	cooperate).	A	growing	body	of	literature	links	
effective	policing	 to	 legitimacy	and	 trustworthiness	 (for	a	brief	overview,	 see	Hawdon	2008),	
which	points	in	the	same	direction.	
Social Capital Literature
A	great	deal	of	 the	 social	 capital	 literature	has	already	been	devoted	 to	 trustful	 relationships	
between	 citizens	 and	power	holders	 and/or	political	 institutions.	A	 lot	 of	 the	 corresponding	
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research	in	the	tradition	of	Tocqueville	has	focused	on	democratic	contexts,	where	associational	
life	is	seen	as	promoting	“bridging”	social	capital,	which	then	improves	the	performance	of	for-
mal	political	institutions,	particularly	by	increasing	“political	trust”	and	supporting	vibrant	civil	
societies.	However,	quantitative	evidence	for	this	standard	argument	is	rather	weak	(see	Newton	
2006).	In	a	large	quantitative	analysis,	Letki	comes	to	the	conclusion	that	“generalized	trust	is	
irrelevant	for	predicting	civic	morality”	(2006,	320).	Some	have	also	argued	that	the	concept	of	
“trust	in	government”	is	flawed,	because	actors	do	not	have	the	necessary	information	to	trust	
institutions	and	power	holders	(see	e.g.	Hardin	1998;	cp.	also	the	critique	by	Rothstein	2004).
Other	 have	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 “linking”	 social	 capital,	 especially	 for	 development	
(Woolcock	2001,	13).	This	refers	to	the	vertical	dimension	consisting	of	“relationships	up	and	
down	the	social	and	economic	scale”	(Field	2003,	66).	Moreover,	as	Grootaert	et	al.	argue,	linking	
social	capital	connects	“people	to	key	political	(and	other)	resources	and	economic	institutions	
–	that	is,	across	power	differentials”	(2004,	4).	Instead	of	drawing	on	the	civil	society/political	
trust	argument,	the	following	section	adopts	Field’s	basic	concept	of	linking	social	capital	and	
presents	arguments	for	why	and	how	it	matters	in	areas	of	limited	statehood.
Why Can’t Hierarchy Renounce Non-coercive Cooperation?
Max	Weber	already	argued	that	coercive	means	alone	are	not	sufficient	to	sustain	legal	order:	
“Only	a	 limited	success	can	be	attained	 through	 the	 threat	of	coercion	supporting	 the	 legal	
order	…	Even	the	most	drastic	means	of	coercion	and	punishment	are	bound	to	fail	where	the	
subjects	remain	recalcitrant”	(Weber	1978,	334;	see	also	Hurd	1999,	385).	This	argument	can	be	
applied	to	hierarchy	in	general.	Hierarchical	coordination	even	in	the	context	of	other	formal	
institutions	needs	actors	on	the	lower	levels	to	cooperate.	Formal	hierarchical	steering	in	itself	
may	not	be	sufficient,	as	James	C.	Scott	shows	in	a	different	context:	In	work-to-rule	actions	
(grèves du zèle)	trade	unions	call	on	their	members	to	“begin	doing	their	jobs	by	meticulously	
observing	every	one	of	the	rules	and	regulations	and	performing	only	the	duties	stated	in	their	
job	descriptions.	The	result,	fully	intended	in	this	case,	is	that	the	work	grinds	to	halt,	or	at	least	
to	a	snail’s	pace”	(Scott	1998,	310).	
The	 following	 quotation	 from	Scharpf	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 another	 example	 of	 the	necessity	 for	
cooperation:	“Hierarchical	coordinators	…	must	be	able	to	base	their	decisions	on	information	
that	 is	 initially	 available	 only	 in	 decentralized	 form	 at	 the	 lower	 levels	 of	 hierarchical	
organizations”	(1993,	131-2).	Hart	also	acknowledged	in	his	seminal	work	on	authority	that	most	
people	comply	willingly	and	that	this	very	fact	makes	its	possible	in	the	first	place	to	employ	
the	available	resources	for	effective	coercion	against	whatever	disobedient	actors	are	left	(1961,	
196).	 Fukuyama	 ultimately	 concludes	 that	 “organizations	 are	 pervaded	 by	 norms	 and	 other	
a-rational	sources	of	behavior,	which	has	important	behavioral	consequences”	(Fukuyama	2005,	
105).	Many	of	these	factors	can	be	subsumed	under	social	capital:	“Social	capital	–	norms	that	
promote	cooperative	behavior	…	substitutes	for	elaborate	formal	incentive	systems”	(Fukuyama	
2005,	85).	Hierarchical	organizations,	as	Fukuyama	outlines,	face	the	problem	that	“all	formal	
organizations	are	overlaid	with	informal	groups,	which	sometimes	correspond	to	the	formal	
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organization’s	boundaries	…	and	sometimes	cross	these	boundaries”	(ibid.,	86).	Thus,	effective	
and	efficient	organizations	have	to	acknowledge	“that	it	is	ultimately	the	informal	norms	and	
group	identities	 that	will	most	strongly	motivate	 the	workers	 in	an	organization	to	do	their	
best”	(ibid.).	From	a	theoretical	perspective,	the	difference	between	organizations	(e.g.,	business	
firms)	and	other	instances	of	hierarchical	coordination	is	not	important.
In	the	following	sections,	I	will	argue	that	the	necessary	cooperative	behavior	across	power	dif-
ferentials	can	be	tied	to	linking	social	capital,	which	allows	us	to	see	cooperative	behavior	and,	as	
it	will	be	argued,	legitimacy	as	outcomes	of	norms,	networks,	and	trustworthiness.
Formal and Informal Institutions
In	the	context	of	hierarchical	coordination,	formal	and	informal	institutions	–	as	a	dimension	
of	linking	social	capital	–	matter	most	if	they	include	hierarchical	structures	(e.g.,	organizations),	
for	 they	 are	 linked	 to	 actors’	 perceptions	 of	 legitimacy	 of	 hierarchies.	 Cooperation	 within	
hierarchies	 depends	 on	 legitimacy,	 a	 norm	 that	 determines	 whose	 preferences	 are	 to	 be	
followed.	Legal	 systems	enable	 social	 coordination	as	well	by	 regulating	behavior	 (cp.	 Jamal	
2007,	 130).	 According	 to	 Ian	Hurd,	 there	 are	 three	 “generic	 reasons”	 explaining	 why	 actors	
comply	within	hierarchies:	“(1)	 because	 the	 actor	 fears	 the	punishment	of	 rule	 enforcers,	 (2)	
because	 the	actor	sees	 the	rule	as	 in	 its	own	self-interest,	and	 (3)	because	 the	actor	 feels	 the	
rule	is	legitimate	and	ought	to	be	obeyed”	(Hurd	1999,	379).	The	dimension	of	“institutions”	in	
the	social	capital	concept	includes	factors	that	affect	whether	actors	indeed	see	hierarchies	as	
legitimate.	Here,	legitimacy	is	understood	according	to	Suchman,	as	a	“generalized	perception	
or	assumption	that	the	actions	of	an	entity	are	desirable,	proper,	or	appropriate	within	some	
socially	constructed	system	of	norms,	values,	beliefs,	and	definitions”	(Suchman	cited	in	Hurd	
1999,	 387).	 These	 norms	 are	 (discursively)	 maintained	 within	 certain	 social	 structures	 (e.g.,	
religious	communities)	that	can	be	captured	by	the	social	capital	approach.	However,	linking	
social	capital	shows	that	 institutions	and	networks	are	 intertwined	because	 institutions	 that	
matter	 for	cooperative	behavior	 in	hierarchies	are	often	also	related	to	corresponding	social	
structures	(captured	as	networks	in	the	social	capital	theory).
Writing	on	state	building	in	Afghanistan	and	Somaliland,	Debiel	et	al.	sum	up	their	research,	
referring	to	the	importance	of	legitimacy	in	areas	of	limited	statehood:	“A	sociopolitical	order	
can	only	be	 sustained	as	 long	as	 it	 is	 regarded	as	 legitimate	or	 as	 immutable”	 (Debiel	 et	 al.	
2009,	39;	cp.	also	Papagianni	2008).	While	legal	authority	(e.g.,	as	exercised	by	the	international	
community	or	any	remaining	state	institutions)	often	lacks	the	necessary	connection	to	informal	
structures	reflected	in	social	capital;	the	boundaries	of	traditional	authority	are	often	identical	
with	the	boundaries	of	social	capital	endowments,	making	their	hierarchical	coordination	more	
effective	and	legitimate	in	the	eyes	of	the	respective	community.	Local	embeddedness	is	often	
a	discursive	reference	point	for	legitimacy.	Lund	writes,	for	example:	“Actors	and	institutions	
often	claim	legitimacy	with	contradictory	reference	to	‘locality.’	Eligibility	to	leadership	often,	
maybe	even	increasingly	often	(Geschiere	and	Gugler,	1998),	depends	on	successful	claims	of	
autochtony	and	belonging”	(Lund	2006,	693).	Lund	goes	on:	“Legitimation	of	public	authority	
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takes	many	 forms,	but	 it	would	seem	that	 territorialization	by	delimitation	and	assertion	of	
control	over	a	geographic	area	offers	a	particularly	potent	language”	(Lund	2006,	695).	
Networks
Traditional	authority	can	often	be	found	on	the	local	level	in	areas	of	limited	statehood	(e.g.,	
local	chieftaincies	in	many	African	states	that	strive	for	public	authority	and	political	control;	
cp.	Lund	2006).	They	are	often	dependent	on	religiously	or	ethnically	defined	social	structures/
networks,	which	are	confined	by	exclusive	social	capital	and	share	certain	social	norms.	If	the	
governors	and	the	governed	are	members	of	the	same	community	and	thus	united	by	the	same	
stocks	of	exclusive	social	capital,	it	supports	the	effectiveness	of	hierarchical	coordination.	Ef-
fective	hierarchical	coordination	increases	when	the	governors	and	the	governed	are	bound	by	
networks	that	facilitate	cooperation.	Jamal	points	out:	
„In	an	environment	such	as	the	West	Bank,	where	associational	life	is	structured	
along	vigorous	pro-	and	anti-PNA	dimensions,	associations	that	were	clients	of	the	
state	reproduced	vertical	ties	between	their	members	and	the	state.	Once	absorbed	
into	 the	whims	 of	 the	 governing	 power,	 those	 associations	most	 benevolent	 in	
form	and	purpose	became	hierarchically	structured,	clientelistic	sites.	Pro-PNA	
association	members	 joined	 to	obtain	service	and	 fulfill	needs,	 to	 ‚help	out,‘	 in	
some	form“	(2007,	129).
The	prevalence	of	neo-patrimonialism	in	areas	of	limited	statehood	is	a	powerful	example	of	
effective	hierarchical	coordination	that	relies	on	kinship	ties	(Clapham	2004,	48),	which	are	as-
sociated	with	bonding	social	capital	(social	capital	within	confined	social	structures)	However,	
corruption	emerges	within	hierarchical	organizations	when	thick	social	networks	undermine	
effective	hierarchical	coordination	for	the	provision	of	governance	(Harris	2007).	Networks	can	
also	undermine	hierarchical	coordination	 in	general	when	 loyalty	 toward	actors	outside	 the	
hierarchical	structure	–	for	example,	to	family	networks	–	prevails,	decreasing	the	hierarchy’s	
effectiveness.	To	illustrate	how	bonding	social	capital	–is	used	to	support	authoritarian	rule,	a	
look	at	Iraq	is	quite	telling.	Brinkerhoff	and	Mayfield	describe	the	situation	as	follows:	
„Authoritarian	 states	 have	 limited	 vertical	 linkages	 (primarily	 downward	 for	
control	 and	 repression)	 and	 often	 use	 a	 perversion	 of	 bonding	 social	 capital	 to	
maintain	power	by	favouring	particular	social	groups	(based	on	kinship,	ethnicity,	
religion	etc.)	over	others.	The	imposed	surface	cohesion	is	inherently	unstable;	if	
and	when	state	control	weakens	and	the	ability	to	reward	the	favoured	groups	slips,	
the	society	disintegrates	into	conflict	and	in	some	cases	violence.	With	respect	to	
bridging	social	capital,	 the	absence	of	social	networks	across	groups	can	 lead	 to	
tension	 and	 distrust	 among	 ethnic	 groups	 (Fearon	 and	 Laitin,	 1996;	Wimmer,	
2003–04)	…	The	regime	suppressed	or	destroyed	social	relations	other	than	those	
integral	to	the	Ba’athist	system	of	state	domination;	ethnic	divisions	were	exploited	
and	traditional	tribal	groups	were	enlisted	for	purposes	of	social	control.	The	use	
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of	executive	and	judicial	agencies	for	selective	service	delivery	and	for	repression	of	
those	deemed	disloyal	built	a	distorted	form	of	bonding	social	capital	among	those	
privileged	groups	co-opted	into	the	system“	(Brinkerhoff	and	Mayfield	2005,	62).
Trustworthiness
On	the	most	basic	level,	actors	have	to	trust	other	actors	not	to	abuse	their	power	in	hierarchies,	
to	use	hierarchical	coordination	for	the	interests	of	a	constituency	as	a	whole	rather	than	for	
their	personal	interests.	Anything	else	would	undermine	legitimacy	and,	as	a	consequence,	the	
stability	of	organizational	structures	(cp.	Scharpf	1993,	132).	Trust(worthiness)	as	an	outcome	of	
iterative	social	interaction	links	social	capital	to	the	effectiveness	and	legitimacy	of	hierarchical	
coordination.	The	degree	of	social	capital	within	a	hierarchical	context	has	an	impact	on	the	
hierarchy’s	performance.	Letki	cites	studies	that	offer	evidence	that	“citizens	who	believe	that	
legislators	and	administrators	fulfill	their	obligations	are	significantly	less	likely	to	disobey	the	
rules	and	cheat	financially,	i.e.	evade	tax	or	claim	benefits	illegally”	(Letki	2006,	309).	Actors	also	
have	to	have	trust	in	procedures	and	institutions	(e.g.,	the	rule	of	law).	Moreover,	social	capital	
in	the	form	of	trust	has	an	impact	on	the	organizational	design	itself	(Creed	and	Miles	1996,	
23ff.;	for	an	overview	of	the	corresponding	organizational	behavior	theory,	see	Kramer	1999;	see	
also	other	contributions	in	Kramer	and	Tyler	1996).
Instead	of	looking	at	political	trust,	which	has	yielded	contradictory	results	(see	above),	it	seems	
beneficial	to	focus	future	research	on	trust/social	capital	within	concrete	contexts	of	hierarchi-
cal	coordination	in	areas	of	limited	statehood,	which	has	not	been	done	thus	far.
Summary
This	section	outlines	the	hypothesis	that	linking	social	capital,	related	to	social	structures	across	
power	differentials,	 is	 important	 for	hierarchical	coordination	in	areas	of	 limited	statehood.	
The	main	argument	is	that	hierarchical	coordination	to	provide	governance	relies	to	a	certain	
degree	 (depending	on	other	 factors	 such	 as	 coercion	 and	 capital)	 on	 voluntary	 cooperation.	
This	cooperation	is	more	likely	when	linking	social	capital	endowments	connect	the	rulers	and	
the	ruled.	In	this	context,	linking	social	capital	can	be	seen	as	functionally	similar	to	what	Tilly	
understands	as	commitments:	
„Commitments	 can	 take	 the	 form	 of	 shared	 religion	 or	 ethnicity,	 trading	 ties,	
work-generated	solidarities,	communities	of	taste,	and	much	more.	To	the	extent	
that	commitments	of	these	sorts	connect	rulers	and	ruled,	they	substitute	partially	
for	coercion	and	capital”	(Tilly	2004,	31).
This	Tillyean	view	explains	in	part	why	traditional	authority	is	often	observed	in	areas	of	limited	
statehood	instead	of	hierarchical	coordination	on	the	state	level.	Limited	statehood	often	results	
from	a	lack	of	coercion	(state	monopoly	on	violence)	and	capital	(underdevelopment),	so	state	
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institutions	are	often	limited	because	of	a	lack	of	legitimacy	and	cooperation.	This	situation	
results	 from	a	 lack	of	bridging	 social	 capital	on	 the	 state	 level.	The	 same	can	be	applied	 to	
the	hierarchical	coordination	exercised	by	the	international	community,	a	substitute	for	state	
authority	in	this	context.	Sub-state	hierarchical	coordination,	in	contrast,	is	more	effective,	for	
it	can	draw	on	the	cooperation	of	community	members	induced	by	social	capital.
This	theoretical	approach	could	help	explain	why	traditional	authority	in	areas	of	limited	state-
hood	is	often	more	effective	than	hierarchical	coordination	by	actors	that	cannot	draw	on	social	
capital	endowments.	The	former	can	rely	more	effectively	on	kinship	groups	and	their	social	
capital	endowments,	 including	 institutions	 that	support	hierarchical	 steering,	networks	 that	
maintain	 certain	 concepts	of	 legitimacy,	 and	 trust	built	by	 iterative	 interaction	between	 the	
rulers	and	the	ruled.	The	long	list	of	failed	peacekeeping	missions	in	areas	of	limited	state-
hood	reveals	how	often	hierarchical	coordination	fails	when	it	is	not	built	on	social	sources	of	
cooperation	(cp.	Boege,	Brown,	and	Clements	2009).	It	shows	that	peacekeepers	or	institutions	
operating	in	the	context	of	state	building	are	likely	to	fail	as	governance	actors	if	they	are	not	in	
tune	with	local	social	conditions.
When	analyzing	hierarchies	in	areas	of	limited	statehood,	it	is	important	keep	the	context	of	
the	 argument	 in	mind:	 empirical	 analyses	 of	 legitimacy	 and	 effectiveness	 in	 the	 context	 of	
hierarchical	coordination	should	not	be	confused	with	 international	 standards	and	 theories	
of	democratic	legitimacy.	This	section	has	provided	a	way	to	empirically	analyze	under	which	
social	conditions	hierarchical	coordination	works,	and	when	it	 is	seen	as	 legitimate	by	 local	
standards.	This	does	not	mean	that	the	outcomes	are	necessarily	desirable	from	a	normative	
perspective.	
This	 section	has	 left	 the	 relationship	between	 social	 capital	 and	power	distributions	within	
hierarchies	untouched.	Social	capital	reflects	the	hierarchical	status	of	actors	and	actor	groups	
(for	an	overview,	see	Adler	and	Kwon	2002,	27;	cp.	Lin	2003).	However,	it	would	be	a	promising	
path	for	future	research	to	look	at	the	unequal	distribution	of	social	capital	and	its	impact	on	
emergence,	effectiveness,	and	reproduction	of	hierarchies.
3.2 Horizontal Coordination
Collaborative/non-hierarchical	 institutions	 rely	 on	 horizontal	 modes	 of	 coordination.	 In	
areas	 of	 limited	 statehood,	 such	 institutions	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 context	 of	 public	 private	
partnerships	(PPPs),	policy	networks,	and,	more	generally,	wherever	different	actors	horizontally	
cooperate	to	provide	governance	without	superior	hierarchical	coordination.	One	example	is	
the	collaborative	establishment	of	sharia	courts	in	Somalia,	where	“a	coalition	of	clan	elders,	
intellectuals,	businesspeople,	and	Muslim	clergy”	was	built	“to	oversee,	finance	and	administer	
a	sharia	court.”	(Menkhaus	2008,	195).	In	this	context,	Menkhaus	also	describes	the	way	in	which	
nongovernmental	 organizations	 (NGOs),	 clan	 elders,	 and	 businesspeople	 have	 successfully	
created	municipalities	as	part	of	sub-state	governance	(Menkhaus	2007,	86).	Common	pooled	
resources	(CPRs)	are	another	example	of	collaborative	institutions	and	business	networks,	for	
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example	networks	of	cross-border	 traders	 (Raeymaekers	2010).	CPRs	horizontally	coordinate	
behavior	for	the	sake	of	providing	collective	goods	(Ostrom	1990,	211).
This	 section	 will	 outline	 how	 bridging	 social	 capital	 endowments	 enable	 effective	 social	
coordination	without	the	state.	Horizontal	coordination	depends	on	actors’	ability	to	coordinate	
their	behavior	without	resorting	to	hierarchical	solutions	(as	discussed	previously).	The	absence	
of	 hierarchical	 coordination	 in	 the	 form	 of	 state	 institutions	 enforcing	 binding	 rules	 and	
decisions	makes	 studying	horizontal	 coordination	 in	areas	of	 limited	statehood	particularly	
puzzling.	For	instance,	actors	cannot	build	their	cooperation	upon	legal	systems.
Governance	 entails	 institutionalized	modes	 of	 coordination	with	 the	 outcome	of	 providing	
binding	rules	and	public	goods.	The	underlying	problem	of	coordination	is	illustrated	in	Figure	
2	(adapted	from	Scharpf	1993,	128).	This	simple	model	pinpoints	the	coordination	problem	by	
presupposing	 that	only	 two	actors	 (x	and	y)	have	five	options	 (A-E)	with	different	 individual	
outcomes.	Actors	can	be	NGOs,	state	institutions,	sub-state	polities,	warlords,	chieftaincies,	firms,	
and	so	on.	Even	if	we	presuppose	the	actors’	interest	in	providing	governance,	they	still	have	
different	priorities	because	the	different	governance	outcomes	have	different	consequences	for	
each	of	them	(logic	of	consequence).	Some	actors	may	be	primarily	interested	in	the	provision	of	
binding	rules	for	efficient	economic	activity,	while	others	prefer	the	provision	of	security	or	the	
provision	of	welfare.	The	corresponding	utility	for	each	actor	is	represented	by	the	positions	of	
the	dots	along	the	Y-	and	X-axis.	Furthermore,	we	can	assume	that	the	community	has	a	general	
interest	in	the	most	comprehensive	provision	of	governance	in	form	of	public	goods.	Thus,	the	
community’s	utility	function	equals	Ux+Uy.	All	outcomes	along	the	axis	crossing	D	are	most	
preferable	for	the	community.
D	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 particular	 governance	 outcome	 at	 the	 maximum	 level.	 However,	 D	 is	
disadvantageous	from	the	perspective	of	x,	while	A	is	to	the	disadvantage	of	y.	A	hierarchical	
coordinator	would	choose	D	and	hierarchically	coordinate	 its	 realization.	Thus,	hierarchical	
coordination	–	at	least	in	this	model	–	is	able	to	realize	the	maximum	governance	outcome	for	
the	community	when	it	is	not	dependent	on	x.
Figure 2: The Problem of Coordination
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A
On the Social Conditions of Governance: Social Capital and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood  |  32
In	the	absence	of	hierarchical	coordination,	however,	the	actors	x	and	y	face	the	problem	of	how	
to	horizontally	coordinate	their	behavior.	When	negotiating,	x	will	prefer	B	while	y	will	prefer	
C.	Thus,	 as	 Scharpf	 argues,	“the	 aggregated	welfare	maximum	 that	 can	 be	 achieved	 through	
negotiated	coordination	will	usually	be	lower	than	the	maximum	achievable	through	hierarchical	
coordination.”	 (Scharpf	1993,	 129).	When	actors	negotiate,	 they	also	 face	various	problems,	 for	
example	related	to	transaction	costs	and	the	risks	of	free	riding.	Generally	speaking,	horizontal	
coordination	is	a	collective	action	dilemma.	Both	actors	could	negotiate	to	realize	D.	However,	
this	would	 imply	 that	 y	 splits	 the	 outcome	with	 x.	X,	 however,	would	presumably	 anticipate	
defection	 by	 y	 and	would	not	 agree.	Hierarchical	 contract	 enforcement	within	 legal	 systems	
would	decrease	the	probability	of	defection	from	x’s	perspective.	Limited	statehood,	however,	is	
characterized	by	its	lack	of	such	hierarchically	enforced	legal	frameworks,	which	is	one	reason	
why	self-coordination	is	seldom	found	empirically	(cp.	Börzel	2007,	47).	Hierarchical	coordination	
(or	its	shadow)	has	consequently	been	seen	as	a	prerequisite	for	self-coordination	(cp.	ibid.,	45ff.).	
This	section	outlines	how	social	capital	serves	as	a	substitute	for	hierarchical	coordination	and	
a	precondition	for	horizontal	coordination.	In	particular,	this	section	argues	that	social	capital	
solves	collective	action	dilemmas	and	thus	improves	non-hierarchical	self-coordination.
Although	actors	have	an	interest	in	coordinating	themselves	in	order	to	provide	public	goods,	
they	often	face	“social	traps”	(Rothstein	2005).	Collective	action	dilemmas	underlying	horizontal	
modes	of	coordination	have	been	studied	extensively	across	the	disciplines.	Many	of	them	have	
been	cast	in	game	theoretical	models	or	similar	language,	without	referring	to	mathematical	
modeling.	Usually	based	on	rational	choice	approaches,	most	of	these	analyses	conclude	that	
collective	action	often	fails	because	rational	actors	opt	not	to	engage	in	cooperative	behavior	
due	to	their	utility-maximizing	strategies.	The	Prisoner’s	Dilemma	has	become	the	epitome	of	
the	collective	action	dilemma.	 Imperfect	knowledge	and	 the	resulting	uncertainty	 leads	 two	
actors,	 let	us	call	 them	Ms.	Bonnie	and	Mr.	Clyde,	 to	not	cooperate	although	both	would	be	
better	off	if	they	did—that	is,	if	they	coordinated	their	behavior.	The	problem	is	that	neither	
one	trusts	the	other	to	cooperate	if	opportunism	implies	better	payoffs.
In	order	to	link	social	capital	to	a	potential	cooperative	behavior	between	Ms.	Bonnie	and	Mr.	
Clyde,	I	will	use	a	so-called	trust	game	(Figure	3).	The	provision	of	governance	is	represented	
by	a	payoff	of	2	to	each	party	(2,2),	putting	both	the	truster	and	the	trustee	in	a	better	position.	
If	 the	 truster	does	not	 trust	 in	 the	first	place,	however,	 the	status	quo	remains	 intact	 (0,0)	–	
for	 example,	 the	 lack	 of	 security	 in	 areas	 of	 limited	 statehood.	 If	 the	 truster	 trusts	 but	 the	
trustee	 does	 not	 reciprocate,	 the	 trustee	 is	 better	 off	 (3)	 while	 the	 truster	 looses	 (-1).	When	
trust	is	matched	with	reciprocal	action,	both	parties	benefit	and	emerge	better	off	than	under	
the	previous	status	quo.	The	trust	game	illustrates	the	general	problem	of	transactions	of	all	
types	that	profit	from	social	capital	breading	trust(worthiness).	As	Kenneth	Arrow	points	out,	
“virtually	 every	 commercial	 transaction	 has	 within	 itself	 an	 element	 of	 trust,	 certainly	 any	
transaction	conducted	over	a	period	of	time”	(Arrow	1972,	356-7,	345).	Arrow	sees	trust	as	one	of	
the	important	“virtues”	underlying	economic	life.
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Figure 3: Trust Game (Ahn and Ostrom 2008)
The	trust	game	serves	as	basic	model	for	the	remainder	of	this	section,	whose	main	question	
will	be	how	the	social	embeddedness	of	actors	and,	more	specifically,	the	resulting	social	capital	
increase	trustworthy	behavior	and,	as	a	result,	interpersonal	trust.	The	basic	assumption	is	that	
actors	 possess	 only	 limited	 information:	 actors	 “have	 no	 direct	 access	 to	 others’	 intentions”	
(Scharpf	1993,	148-149),	that	their	choices	are	limited	by	institutions	(North	1990),	and	that	they	
follow	logics	of	appropriateness	(March	and	Olsen	1998)	and	logics	of	arguing	(Risse	2000).	This	
section	thus	presupposes	that	actors	are	not	universally	selfish	(see	Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	xiv-xv).
In	 areas	 of	 limited	 statehood,	 the	 risk	 of	 anarchy	 and	 the	 shadow	 of	 hierarchy	“from	 afar”	
motivate	 actors,	 following	 a	 logic	 of	 consequence,	 to	 contribute	 to	 governance	 (Börzel	 and	
Risse	 2010,	 120).	This	 incentive-based	motivation,	 however,	 does	 not	 automatically	 translate	
into	a	solving	collective	action	problems	that	actors	face	independent	of	their	intentions.	The	
same	holds	true	for	actors	that	are	motivated	to	play	the	governance	game	by	their	normative	
environment	(logic	of	appropriateness).	It	may	be	the	“right	thing	to	do”	for	a	multinational	
firm	to	adhere	to	certain	standards	or	to	fund	health	institutions.	However,	this	does	not	change	
the	collective	action	dilemma	the	firm	faces	when	engaging	with	other	actors	in	the	provision	
of	 governance.	 Schneckener	 and	Zürcher	 exemplify	 this	 claim	by	writing	 that	 transnational	
security	 governance	 in	 areas	 of	 limited	 statehood	 depends	 on	 the	“quality	 of	 coordination”	
amongst	NGOs,	INGOs,	IOs,	local	stakeholders,	and	state	institutions	in	place	(Schneckener	and	
Zürcher	2007,	218).	Raeymaekers	provides	a	concrete	example,	writing	on	non-state	governance	
in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo:	
„A	remarkable	initiative	of	the	local	entrepreneurs,	for	example,	was	their	financing	
of	the	city	council	building,	which	stands	several	floors	high	on	Butembo’s	highest	
hilltop.	In	the	middle	of	the	war,	Butembo’s	traders	also	financed	the	construction	
of	a	 local	electricity	plant,	which	was	eventually	abandoned	because	of	a	 lack	of	
commitment	of	their	South	African	partners“	(Raeymaekers	2010,	576).
Social	capital	as	trustworthiness,	networks,	and	institutions	directly	affects	how	the	governance	
game	 is	 played:	 “The	 economic	 and	 political	 performances	 of	 societies,	 from	 villages	 to	
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international	communities,	depend	critically	on	how	the	members	of	a	community	solve	the	
problem	of	collective	action”	(Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	xiii).	Social	capital	is	just	one	factor	among	
many	that	change	collective	action	settings,	but	it	seems	to	capture	what	matters	most;	collective	
action	is	determined	“by	a	complex	configuration	of	various	factors	that	we	categorize	as	forms	
of	social	capital”	(ibid.,	xvi).
Trust(worthiness)
If	actors	share	an	interest	in	providing	public	goods,	they	ought	to	invest	in	cooperation	(e.g.,	
regarding	time	and	other	resources	when	participating	in	negotiations	or	funding	local	admin-
istrations).	Fundamental	uncertainty	about	the	preferences	of	the	other	actors	(and	their	cor-
responding	action),	however,	often	turns	coordination	into	a	series	of	trust	games	that	depend	
on	the	trust	actors	have	in	each	other.	Interpersonal	trust,	in	turn,	depends	on	several	factors,	
for	example	on	knowledge	about	the	potential	trustee	and	on	the	normative	structures	in	which	
both	actors	are	embedded.
Interpersonal	 trust	 is	a	 function	of	 the	 trustor’s	belief	 in	 the	 trustworthiness	of	 the	 trustee.	
The	trustor’s	heuristics	are	mainly	based	on	 information	about	 the	 trustee	and	the	 trustee’s	
preferences.	Information	about	the	trustee’s	past	interactions	is	crucial,	for	reputation	is	one	
of	 the	main	 sources	 of	 trust.	As	 experimental	 research	 on	 iterative	 forms	 of	 the	 Prisoner’s	
Dilemma	shows	(Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	xvii),	trustees	have	incentives	to	reciprocate	as	long	as	
interactions	are	repetitive.	If	they	do	not	reciprocate,	they	risk	positive	outcomes	from	future	
interactions.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 information	 on	 the	 trustee’s	 incentive	 structures	 is	 of	 great	
value	 for	 the	subjective	assessment	of	 trustworthiness.	Legal	systems	and	their	enforcement	
play	an	important	role	in	this	context.	Expected	punishment	for	defection	affects	the	incentives	
structure	of	the	trustee	known	to	the	trustor.
The	trustee’s	 trustworthiness,	however,	 is	not	only	a	 function	of	his/her	 incentives	structure	
but	also	of	what	s/he	regards	as	“appropriate”	behavior.	Social	norms	contained	in	social	capital	
affect	 trustworthiness	beyond	 the	pure	utility-maximizing	behavior	 sketched	above.	 Socially	
shared	norms	of	reciprocity	have	an	impact	on	the	average	trustworthiness	of	communities.	
This	does	not	mean	 that	everyone	 in	 the	respective	community	can	be	 trusted,	but	 that	 the	
likelihood	of	reciprocity	is	higher	where	norms	of	reciprocity	prevail	 (cp.	Putnam,	Leonardi,	
and	Nanetti	1993,	171ff.)	Social	norms	of	cooperation	are,	moreover,	“an	independent	input	to	the	
trustor’s	probability	assessment	when	faced	with	an	anonymous	individual	or	individuals	in	a	
collective-action	situation”	(Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	xx).	These	social	norms	may	be	derived	from	
culture	and	other	values	(cp.	Fukuyama	1996)	but	also	from	iterative	interactions,	as	Putnam	et	
al.	have	argued:	“repeated	exchange	over	a	period	of	time	tends	to	encourage	the	development	
of	a	norm	of	generalized	reciprocity”	(Putnam,	Leonardi,	and	Nanetti	1993,	172).
Following	 the	 arguments	 presented	 here,	 “traditional”	 normative	 structures	 should	 at	 last	
partially	 account	 for	 cooperative	 behavior	 by	 actors	 in	 areas	 of	 limited	 statehood.	 Studying	
norms	 shared	 by	 communities	 in	 areas	 of	 limited	 statehood	 should	 help	 future	 research	
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understand	 the	 success	 of	 non-hierarchical	 coordination	 –	 especially	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 an	
effectively	enforced	legal	framework	for	transaction.	Trustworthiness	increased	by	social	norm	
can	be	measured	as	“generalized	trust”	within	social	entities,	which	is,	as	Scharpf	e.g.	argues,	
“enormously	advantageous.”	However,	it	is	“easily	destroyed	by	the	pursuit	of	self-interest	at	the	
partner’s	expense”	(Scharpf	1993,	153).
Networks
Cooperation	is	embedded	in	social	structures	(cp.	Scharpf	1993,	147ff.).	Social	capital	has	cap-
tured	this	structural	component	by	including	social	networks	in	its	concept	(see	e.g.	Field	2003,	
44ff.;	Putnam,	Leonardi,	and	Nanetti	1993,	171ff.;	Woolcock	and	Narayan	2000).	James	C.	Mitchell	
has	defined	social	networks	as	a	“specific	set	of	linkages	among	a	defined	set	of	persons,	with	
the	additional	property	that	the	characteristics	of	these	linkages	as	a	whole	may	be	used	to	in-
terpret	the	social	behavior	of	the	person	involved”	(Mitchell	1969,	2).	
Among	other	goods	and	resources,	network	members	share	information,	including	information	
about	opportunistic	behavior	on	the	part	of	others,	which	in	consequence	may	damage	certain	
actors’	 reputations.	 Moreover,	 networks	 include	 repetitive	 interactions,	 which	 “provides	
incentives	to	 individuals	to	build	a	reputation	of	being	trustworthy”	 (Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	
xvii).	 The	 interactions	 also	 “encourage	 the	 development	 of	 reciprocity	 norms	 through	 the	
transmission	of	information	across	individuals	about	who	are	trustworthy	and	who	are	not”	
(Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	xxii).
In	the	Tocquevillian	tradition,	many	scholars	have	outlined	that	membership	in	associations	
(which	I	see	as	a	specific	kind	of	network)	increases	cooperation	when	actors	“learn”	cooperative	
behavior	through	socialization.	This	is	seen	as	being	advantageous	for	the	whole	society	beyond	
the	specific	network’s	boundaries.	Putnam	et	al.	name	four	beneficial	outcomes	of	networks:
 
•	 Networks	of	civic	engagement	increase	the	potential	costs	to	a	defector	in	any	indivi-
dual	transaction.	…		Networks	of	civic	engagement,	in	the	language	of	game	theory,	
increase	the	iteration	and	interconnectedness	of	games.
•	 Networks	of	civic	engagement	foster	robust	norms	of	reciprocity.	…
•	 Networks	of	civic	engagement	facilitate	communication	and	improve	the	flow	of	in-
formation	about	the	trustworthiness	of	individuals.	…
•	 Networks	of	civic	engagement	embody	past	success	at	collaboration,	which	can	serve	
as	a	culturally-defined	template	for	future	collaboration..”	(Putnam,	Leonardi,	and	
Nanetti	1993,	173-4)
However,	a	democratic	bias	looms	large	in	scholarship	on	the	role	of	associations.	Social	capital	
is	often	analyzed	with	regard	to	the	functioning	of	democratic	institutions.	Not	only	are	parts	
of	the	methodologies	employed	in	this	context	seen	as	“flawed”	(Jackman	and	Miller	1998,	60),	
but	the	overall	argument	does	not	seem	wholly	transferrable	outside	of	democratic	structures	
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in	consolidated	states.	One	reason	is	that	the	outcomes	of	network-based	social	capital	seem	to	
depend	largely	on	their	social	and	political	conditions	(van	Deth	and	Zmerli	2010).	Outside	the	
democratic	context,	networks	may	do	little	more	than	serve	the	reproduction	of	non-democratic	
state	institutions	(see	e.g.	Jamal	2007).	Moreover,	taking	economic	performance	as	an	indicator	
of	the	positive	outcomes	of	social	capital	endowments,	Knack	and	Keefer	find	that	trust	and	
civic	 cooperation	 are	 positively	 correlated	 with	 economic	 performance,	 but	 associational	
membership	(often	equated	with	networks)	is	not	(1997).	Therefore,	looking	at	areas	of	limited	
statehood,	it	should	not	simply	be	assumed	that	networks	in	the	form	of	associations	contribute	
to	a	more	democratic	governance	provision	per	se.	However,	when	networks	include	different	
actors	 in	 the	 governance	 game,	 they	 should	 have	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 the	 actors’	 ability	 to	
overcome	collective	action	dilemmas	within	horizontal	modes	of	coordination.	The	stronger	
the	network	ties	between	different	actors,	the	lower	the	risks	of	opportunistic	behavior	when	
they	coordinate.	Thus,	effective	horizontal	cooperation	can	be	expected	where	social	networks	
link	actors	with	the	incentive	to	coordinate	their	behavior	for	the	provision	of	governance.
Institutions
Institutions,	as	rules	of	the	games,	are,	following	Douglas	C.	North,	the	“constraints	that	shape	
human	interaction.”	They	“include	both	what	individuals	are	prohibited	from	doing	and,	some-
times,	under	what	conditions	some	individuals	are	permitted	to	undertake	certain	activities.	
…	 [T]hey	 therefore	 are	 the	 framework	within	which	 human	 interaction	 takes	 place”	 (North	
1990,	3-4).	Formal	institutions	in	the	form	of	written	laws,	for	instance,	often	determine	how	
actors	interact.	When	they	are	not	enforced,	however,	custom	and	convention	can	substitute	as	
informal	institutions	(Jensen	2008).	They	order	behavior	to	the	advantage	or	disadvantage	of	
cooperation.
Legal	systems	include	many	formal	institutions	such	as	written	laws,	court	decisions,	and	so	on.	
If	they	regulate	cooperation	(e.g.,	by	providing	contract	enforcement	or	securing	property	rights),	
they	assist	horizontal	cooperation	by	being	“important	sources	 for	self-governance.”	Ostrom	
and	Ahn	therefore	argue	that	“a	rule	of	 law,	a	democratic	atmosphere,	and	a	well-structured	
government	(if	these	exist)	are	valuable	social	capital	for	any	society”	(Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	xxii).	
These	factors	support	the	trustworthiness	of	actors	by	punishing	and	penalizing	opportunism.	
Moreover,	they	provide	the	framework	for	self-governing	and	for	the	development	of	working	
rules	that	structure	social	interactions	(Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	xxiii-xxiv).
Areas	 of	 limited	 statehood	 are	 not	 void	 of	 institutions.	 Moreover,	 actors	 find	 themselves	
in	 situations	 of	 “legal	 pluralism”	 (see	 e.g.	 Kötter	 and	 Schuppert	 2009),	 where	 a	 variety	 of	
institutions	make	 up	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game.	When	 looking	 at	 how	 social	 capital	 facilitates	
horizontal	 cooperation,	 formal	and	 informal	 institutions	are	 relevant	 that	 are	 related	 to	 the	
social	 structures	 in	which	 actors	operate	 and	buildt	 their	 social	 capital.	 Formal	 institutions	
such	as	the	right	to	assembly	and	the	right	to	private	communication	bolster	social	interactions	
that	lead	to	higher	levels	of	social	capital.	Parboteeah	et	al.	confirm	this	in	their	cross-national	
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quantitative	 analysis,	 concluding	 that	 higher	 levels	 of	 political	 democracy	 (including	 basic	
rights)	create	“an	environment	conducive	to	volunteering”	(Parboteeah,	Cullen,	and	Lim	2004,	
438).
Radnitz	et	al.	did	not	conceptualize	institutions	in	their	quantitative	research	as	a	dimension	
of	 social	 capital	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 Ostrom	 and	 Ahn.	 However,	 they	 found	 that	 political	
institutions	indeed	account	for	the	quantitative	level	of	interactions,	stating	that	“a	more	liberal	
regime	 leads	 to	more	networking”	 (2009,	 722)	while	 repressive	 state	 institutions	 inhibit	 the	
development	of	networks	(as	in	the	case	of	Uzbekistan	compared	to	Kyrgyzstan).	However,	it	is	
important	to	note	that	some	institutions	can	also	undermine	social	capital,	since	“institutions	
are	not	necessarily	or	even	usually	created	to	be	socially	efficient;	rather	 they,	or	at	 least	 the	
formal	rules,	are	created	to	serve	the	interests	of	those	with	the	bargaining	power	to	devise	new	
rules”	(North	1990,	16).
Bridging versus Bonding Social Capital
As	outlined	above,	much	of	the	literature	distinguishes	between	bonding	and	bridging	social	
capital.	 Bonding	 social	 capital	 refers	 to	 network	 ties	 that	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 corresponding	 to	
Granovetter’s	concept	of	“strong	ties”	(Granovetter	1973),	characteristic	of	families	and	kinship	
networks,	 for	example	 (Ostrom	and	Ahn	2003,	xxii).	Bridging	social	capital	represents	rather	
“weak	ties”	(ibid.)	that	link	actors	in	a	looser	ways.	While	bonding	social	capital	can	be	associated	
with	 easier	 horizontal	 cooperation	within	 confined	 social	 structures,	 bridging	 social	 capital	
seems	to	be	of	particular	importance	for	country-wide	horizontal	coordination	aiming	at	the	
provision	of	governance	across	different	groups	and	(collective)	actors.
Summary 
In	this	section,	horizontal	cooperation	has	been	associated	with	the	fundamental	problem	of	
trust	under	uncertainty,	 especially	 regarding	 the	 intention	of	others	 to	 cooperate.	The	 trust	
game	 served	 as	 game	 theoretical	 example	 showing	 that	 trust	 leads	 to	 collective	 action	with	
beneficial	outcomes.	In	areas	of	limited	statehood,	it	is	not	sufficient	for	actors	to	have	a	shared	
interest	in	coordinating	their	behavior	to	provide	public	goods.	Coordination	in	the	absence	
of	 hierarchical	 steering	 requires	 trustworthiness	 and	 trust,	 both	 of	 which	 are	 increased	 by	
(bridging)	social	capital.	Generalized	trust	levels	are	increased	when	social	capital	endowments	
are	higher.	Norms,	networks,	and	informal	institutions	lead	to	higher	levels	of	trustworthiness	
and	trust,	which	translates	into	higher	levels	of	cooperative	behavior.	(Bridging)	social	capital	
endowments	should	account	for	some	of	 the	variance	in	terms	of	where	and	to	what	extent	
horizontal	 coordination	 takes	 place:	 levels	 of	 governance	 provision	 should	 be	 lower	 where	
horizontal	cooperation	cannot	draw	on	high	levels	of	bridging	social	capital.
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3.3 Clustered Coordination
„Ethnic,	religious,	linguistic,	regional,	functional,	and	class	identities	have	created	
solidarities	that	do	not	coincide	with	nation-state	boundaries“	(March	and	Olsen	
1998,	946).
“Trust	networks”	do	not	directly	fit	into	the	dichotomy	of	horizontal/hierarchical	coordination,	
since	they	can	rely	on	either	structure.	What	distinguishes	them	from	the	other	modes	is	that	they	
are	built	exclusively	on	bonding	social	capital	and	consequently	consist	of	coordination	limited	
to	confined	social	networks.	These	networks	often	compensate	for	the	lack	of	governance	by	
providing	collective	goods	(e.g.,	caring	fraternities)	but	often	exclusively	to	their	members	(“club	
goods”).	This	chapter	argues	that	trust	networks	make	up	a	third	mode	of	social	coordination,	
which	 I	will	 label	“clustered	coordination”	or	“clustered	governance.”	Trust	networks	can	be	
seen	 as	 one	 end	of	 the	 governance	 continuum	 (cp.	Risse	 and	Lehmkuhl	 2007,	 28):	 the	 least	
inclusive	provision	(e.g.,	welfare	services	by	sodalities	for	their	members).	On	the	other	end	is	
the	most	inclusive	provision	of	public	goods	(e.g.,	in	OECD	states	with	their	impartial	provision	
of	governance).	There	are	many	examples	of	trust	networks	as	part	of	the	governance	landscape.	
Among	others,	they	include	ethnically	defined	social	groups	(e.g.,	clan	structures	in	Somaliland;	
Menkhaus	2008,	196),	clientelistic	networks,	and	various	kinship	groups.	
Most	of	the	previous	quantitative	research	on	social	capital	presupposes	that	aggregate	levels	of	
trust	are	a	solid	indicator	of	social	capital	endowments	(cp.	e.g.	Adam	2006;	Harris	2007;	Knack	
and	Keefer	1997,	1255;	Parboteeah,	Cullen,	and	Lim	2004).	However,	this	is	at	odds	with	the	in-
sight	that	social	capital	is	often	created	by	social	networks	through	iterative	social	interactions	
and	shared	in-group	norms.	If	social	capital	is	confined	to	particular	social	networks	where	it	
bonds	actors	together,	the	increased	ability	to	coordinate	is	also	limited	to	the	particular	social	
network.	Thus,	the	provision	of	governance	becomes	“clustered.”	March	and	Olsen	describe	a	
situation	that	exemplifies	this	use	of	the	term	“clustered”:	
„At	the	end	of	the	twentieth	century,	many	states	show	symptoms	of	incoherence	
and	 disintegration	 somewhat	 reminiscent	 of	 an	 earlier	 time	 when	 political	
life	 involved	 confusing,	 overlapping,	 and	 conflicting	 demands	 on	 individual	
allegiances;	 and	 when	 polities	 were	 organized	 around	 emperors,	 kings,	 feudal	
lords,	 churches,	 chartered	 towns,	guilds,	 and	 families“	 (March	and	Olsen	1998,	
946).
This	environment	of	clustered	governance	often	includes	governance	actors	such	as	“warlords	
and	 their	militias	 in	 outlying	 regions,	 gang	 leaders	 in	 townships	 and	 squatter	 settlements,	
vigilante-type	 organizations,	 ethnically	 based	 protection	 rackets,	 millenarian	 religious	
movements,	 transnational	networks	of	extended	family	relations	or	organized	crime,	or	new	
forms	of	tribalism”	(Boege,	Brown,	and	Clements	2009,	16).	For	these	types	of	actors,	bonding	
social	capital	is	an	asset	just	as	bridging	social	capital	is	an	asset	for	consolidated	states.	In	areas	
of	limited	statehood,	bonding	social	capital,	often	related	to	ethnic	identities,	is	often	employed	
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by	militias	that	“mobilize	networks	of	ethnic	solidarities	to	fight	enemies	during	war”	(Reno	
2008,	144).
The	main	problem	in	this	context	is	that	social	capital	generated	in	exclusive	social	networks	
does	not	necessarily	translate	into	bridging	social	capital	aside	from	further	bolstering	exclu-
sive	social	identities	and	collective	action	among	the	respective	constituencies.	Social	capital	in	
this	context	relates	to	“strong	trust”	(Scharpf	1997,	138)	or	“unconditional	trust”	as	understood	
by	Luhman:
„Unconditional	trust	is	generated	in	families	and	small-scale	societies	and	cannot	
be	automatically	transferred	to	complex	societies	based	on	the	division	of	labour.	
Trust,	 then,	 needs	 for	 its	 reconstruction	 special	 social	 institutions;	 friendship	
networks	and	patron-client	relations	are	examples	for	this	adaptation“	(Luhmann	
2000,	94).
If	levels	of	trust	are	community-	or	rather	network-specific,	members	of	the	respective	social	
structures	will	 cooperate	among	 themselves.	Moreover,	 as	Field	writes	on	 the	“dark	 side”	of	
social	capital:	“Cooperative	actions	that	benefit	the	participants	may	produce	undesirable	effects	
for	the	wider	society”	 (Field	2003,	72).	Thus,	as	he	acknowledges,	“we	need	to	understand	the	
extent	to	which	all	may	gain	access	to	its	benefits,	and	it	therefore	serves	as	a	public	good,	or,	on	
the	contrary,	whether	groups	may	control	and	deny	access	to	its	benefits,	in	which	case	it	may	
correspond	more	to	what	some	have	called	a	‘club	good’”	(ibid.).	Trust	networks	are	a	powerful	
example	of	 this	“dark	side”	of	 social	 capital.	They	can	be	defined	as	“ramified	 interpersonal	
connections,	consisting	mainly	of	strong	ties,	within	which	people	set	value,	consequential,	long-
term	resources	and	enterprises	at	risk	to	the	malfeasance,	mistakes,	or	failures	of	others”	(Tilly	
2004,	12).	Tilly	has	argued	that	trust	networks	can	undermine	state	governance	by	competing	
with	other	(state)	actors:
„Over	 thousands	 of	 years,	 nevertheless,	 ordinary	 people	 have	 committed	 their	
major	energies	and	most	precious	resources	to	trust	networks	–	not	only	clandestine	
religious	 sects,	 to	 be	 sure,	 but	 also	more	public	 religious	 solidarities,	 lineages,	
trade	diasporas,	patron-client	chains,	credit	networks,	societies	of	mutual	aid,	age	
grades,	and	some	kinds	of	local	communities.	But	trust	networks	often	compete	
with	rulers	for	the	same	resources,	for	example	such	basics	as	money,	land,	and	
labor	power.	Rulers	have	usually	coveted	the	resources	embedded	in	such	networks,	
have	 often	 treated	 them	as	 obstacles	 to	 effective	 rule,	 yet	 have	never	 succeeded	
in	annihilating	 them	and	have	usually	worked	out	 accommodations	producing	
enough	resources	and	compliance	to	sustain	their	regimes“	(Tilly	2004,	6).
Trust	 networks	work	 because:	Actors	 that	 are	willing	 to	 cooperate	 face	 the	 risk	 of	 losing	 if	
they	trust	others	who	are	not	trustworthy.	Actors	embedded	in	strong	networks	have	incentives	
to	cooperate	with	their	peers	rather	than	with	outsiders.	Strong	and	small	networks	transmit	
information	about	opportunistic	behavior	more	efficiently	than	large	ones.	Thus,	actors	have	
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strong	incentives	to	behave	in	a	trustworthy	manner,	especially	if	the	costs	of	exit	are	relatively	
high	(Tilly	2004,	42-43).	One	reason	for	the	high	costs	of	exit	is	that	people	rely	on	strong	inter-
personal	connections	when	it	comes	to	high-risk	collective	action,	as	Tilly	outlines:
„cohabitation;	procreation;	placement	of	children;	stigmatized	pleasures;	sharing	
of	esoteric	knowledge,	including	heretical	beliefs;	barter;	credit;	private	warfare;	
long-distance	trade	in	goods	with	high	value	for	weight	and	bulk;	pooled	water	
control;	and	finally,	provision	for	illness,	madness,	and	old	age”	(2004,	43).
Actors	are	dependent	on	the	trust	network	and	therefore	face	high	costs	of	being	expelled	when	
they	defect	from	the	norm	of	trustworthiness.	This	holds	especially	true	where	actors	rely	on	
the	welfare	function	that	confined	social	structures	provide.	Maintaining	membership	is	thus	a	
necessity	for	many	where	welfare	is	not	provided	by	the	state.	Boege	et	al.	describe	this	situation	
in	their	account	of	hybrid	political	order:	“The	most	fundamental	and	reliable	social	safety	net	is	
often	provided	by	kin	groups,	based	on	customary	norms	of	reciprocity	and	sharing.	Civil	society	
institutions,	most	notably	 churches	or	other	 religious	 institutions,	play	 an	 important	 role	 in	
providing	basic	public	goods	such	as	health	and	education	in	hybrid	political	orders”	(2009,	19).
At	the	same	time,	networks	are	often	formed	around	common	beliefs	that	feed	into	norms	of	
solidarity	 and	 reciprocity	 among	members.	 Following	 the	 logic	 of	 appropriateness,	 trustees	
often	behave	in	a	trustworthy	way,	which	reinforces	trust	in	repetitive	interactions.	Not	all	of	
the	 functions	of	 trust	networks	 are	governance,	but	 the	networks	matter	 in	 two	ways:	 First,	
they	substitute	for	governance	by	providing	security,	welfare,	and	other	public	goods	to	their	
members.	Second,	trust	networks	have	incentives	to	cooperate	with	state	institutions	and	other	
actors	to	efficiently	coordinate	their	behavior	to	provide	public	goods	(cp.	Tilly’s	work	on	the	
integration	of	trust	networks;	2004,	100ff.).	If	social	capital	is	limited	to	confined	social	groups,	
it	increases	the	ability	to	coordinate	among	the	members	exclusively.	In	the	absence	of	gover-
nance	and	more	bridging	forms	of	social	capital,	these	trust	networks	undermine	the	inclusive	
provision	of	governance	by	providing	governance	equivalents	only	to	their	members.	Exclusive	
bonding	social	capital	accounts	for	in-group	provision	of	governance	along	ethnic,	religious,	or	
familial	lines	and	other	boundaries.
Confined	social	structures	can	weaken	any	remaining	state	institutions	when	these	networks	
overlap	with	them	as	“societal	structures,”	as	Volker	Boege	et	al.	suggest:
„Traditional	 societal	 structures	 –	 extended	 families,	 clans,	 tribes,	 religious	
brotherhoods,	village	communities	–	and	traditional	authorities	such	as	village	
elders,	clan	chiefs,	healers,	big	men,	and	religious	leaders	determine	the	everyday	
social	reality	of	large	parts	of	the	population	in	so-called	fragile	states	even	today,	
particularly	in	rural	and	remote	peripheral	areas.	Moreover,	state	institutions	are	
to	a	certain	extent	‘‘infiltrated’’	and	overwhelmed	by	these	‘‘informal’’	indigenous	
societal	institutions	and	social	forces	that	work	according	to	their	own	logics	and	
rules	within	the	state	structures“	(2009,	15).
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Menkhaus,	who	has	analyzed	non-state	governance	in	Somaliland,	illustrates	how	the	provision	of	
governance	is	often	confined	to	certain	social	structures.	Menkhaus	has	observed	that	the	“most	
visible	manifestations	of	subnational	governance	in	Somlia	are	the	formal,	self-declared	admin-
istrations”	(2008,	193).	These	“polities”	have	emerged	after	the	UNOSOM	operation	in	March	1995.	
While	their	functional	capacities	and	duration	have	varied	enormously,	“most	of	these	regional	
and	transregional	polities	are	or	were	essentially	clan	homelands.	…	Even	authorities	that	appear	
to	be	based	on	aprewar	regional	unit	are	often	thinly	disguised	clan	polities”	(ibid.).
Subnational	governance,	it	can	be	argued,	often	relies	on	trust	among	kinship	groups.	In	So-
malian	“clanustan,”	 actors	 cooperate	 to	provide	 the	 rule	of	 law	 (often	 through	Sharia	 courts	
founded	by	local	coalitions),	but	the	institutionalized	modes	of	governance	are	confined	to	the	
social	 capital	within	clans:	“These	sharia	court	 systems	remained	eminently	 local	 in	nature,	
rarely	able	to	project	their	authority	beyond	a	town	or	district	level	or	to	exercise	jurisdiction	
over	clans	that	are	not	parties	to	the	court	administration.	They	thus	offer	rule	of	law	within,	
but	not	between,	clans”	(Menkhaus	2008,	196).	Nonetheless,	some	of	them	have	still	been	suc-
cessful	as	local	polities	in	that	they	“have	managed	to	provide	some	basic	services,	operate	piped	
water	systems,	regulate	marketplaces,	and	collect	modest	levels	of	taxes	and	user	fees	to	cover	
salaries”	(Menkhaus	2008,	196).	This	could	be	seen	as	positive	externalities	of	bonding	social	
capital	(similar	to	positive	effects	of	some	gangs;	see	e.g.	Campbell	2001).	Sodalities	that	provide	
security	in	Sierra	Leone	are	further	examples	of	bonding	social	capital	in	the	context	of	non-
state	governance	(see	Richards,	Bah,	and	Vincent	2004,	10).
The	puzzle	 is	why	actors	 in	areas	of	 limited	statehood	coordinate	 their	behavior	not	on	the	
most	effective	level	but	along	the	lines	of	socially	defined	groups.	I	argue	that	actors	that	are	
members	of	trust	networks	are	motivated	by	the	shadow	of	anarchy	to	effectively	play	the	gov-
ernance	game.	In	areas	of	limited	statehood,	where	state	institutions	cannot	effectively	enforce	
an	institutional	environment	for	cooperation,	trustworthiness	(including	norms)	and	networks	
are	more	important	than	in	situations	where	formal	institutions	facilitate	cooperation.	Social	
capital	as	a	source	of	trust	thus	becomes	especially	relevant	where	actors	are	coordinating	in	
an	environment	of	near	anarchy—if	hierarchical	organizations	do	not	solve	the	coordination	
problem	 in	a	Hobbesian	way.	 If	members	of	 trust	networks	commonly	 share	 the	 incentives	
to	provide	governance,	 these	networks	might	substitute	for	 functions	otherwise	provided	by	
more	inclusive	forms	of	governance	(e.g.,	when	large	families	provide	welfare	services	to	their	
members).
Social	 capital,	 however,	 is	 often	 only	 available	 in	 defined	 groups	 where	 information	 about	
members’	 past	 opportunism	 is	 available	 and	 shared	 normative	 beliefs	 effectively	 regulate	
behavior	and	interaction.	Previous	conflicts	and	a	lacking	history	of	inter-group	cooperation	
enforce	 social	 divisions:	 “Fragile	 states	 have	 citizens	who	 are	 polarized	 in	 ethnic,	 religious,	
or	class-based	groups,	with	histories	of	distrust,	grievance,	and/or	violent	conflict.	They	 lack	
the	capacity	to	cooperate,	compromise,	and	trust”	(Brinkerhoff	and	Johnson	2009,	587).	There	
is	evidence	of	a	correlation	between	ethnicity	and	certain	types	of	trust	(cp.	Clague,	Gleason,	
and	Knack	2001;	Glaeser	et	al.	2000,	193-194;	Jackman	and	Miller	2004;	Zakaria	1997,	35).	This	
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is	of	particular	relevance	for	the	provision	of	governance	in	areas	where	socially	constructed	
ethnicity	largely	structures	social	networks	and	thus	accounts	for	the	endowments	of	bonding	
social	capital.
Social	 capital	may	 also	 be	 detrimental	“because	 group	 solidarity	 in	 human	 communities	 is	
often	 purchased	 at	 the	 price	 of	 hostility	 towards	 out-group	members”	 (Fukuyama	 2001,	 8).	
Solidarity	 among	 gang	members	 does	 not	 necessarily	 contribute	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 civil	
society	associations	that,	for	example,	monitor	state	actions	(cp.	Putnam	2000,	315-316).	Brinkley	
has	 described	 how	 parochial	 communities	 may	 foster	 an	 inward-looking,	 segregating	 type	
of	culture	 (Brinkley	1996).	Furthermore,	groups	united	by	strong	bonding	social	capital	may	
become	“rent-seekers”	(cp.	Olson	1982)	and	undermine	efficiency	by	exclusively	using	network	
resources	while	bolstering	corruption	and	creating	clientelistic	structures	(Jamal	2007).	
Much	of	the	social	capital	 literature	takes	a	generally	positive	tone	toward	its	consequences.	
This	may	partially	be	attributed	to	the	OECD-centered	research,	where	the	negative	effects	of	
social	capital	–	for	example	in	the	form	of	networks	of	corruption	–	are	balanced	by	strong	state	
institutions.	However,	in	areas	where	the	state	does	not	enforce	institutional	orders	to	regulate	
trust	networks,	the	dark	side	of	social	capital	can	become	even	darker.	
4. Conclusion 
OECD	states	hierarchically	enforce	rules	and	decisions	and	provide	other	public	goods.	In	the	
Hobbesian	tradition,	 their	role	 is	often	legitimized	with	reference	to	the	human	inability	 to	
fulfill	these	functions	commonly	in	a	supposedly	anarchic	state	of	nature.	The	state	can	be	seen	
as	a	functional	solution	to	the	problem	of	collective	action.	Empirical	findings,	however,	have	
shown	that	many	functions	that	the	OECD	state	provides	can	also	be	found	in	areas	of	limited	
statehood,	where	states	are	weak	due	to	a	lack	of	domestic	sovereignty.	This	paper	attempts	to	
conceptually	address	this	puzzle.
According	 to	 political	 sociology,	 (political)	 institutions	 always	 rely	 on	 underlying	 social	
conditions.	This	paper	argued	that	social	capital,	resulting	from	actors’	social	embeddedness,	
influences	how	actors	interact	and	coordinate	their	behavior—on	both	the	individual	and	the	
aggregate	level.	The	paper	broadened	and	transferred	some	of	the	main	arguments	from	social	
capital	theory	to	areas	of	limited	statehood,	while	striving	to	conceptually	explain	the	puzzle	of	
governance	without	a	state.	Arguing	that	the	provision	of	governance	confronts	various	actors	
with	collective	action	problems,	a	“game”	metaphor	was	used	to	describe	the	problem	of	social	
coordination	in	the	absence	of	domestic	sovereignty.	Interpersonal	trust	and	trustworthiness	
–	as	primary	outcomes	of	social	capital	–	have	been	linked	to	how	(collective)	actors	coordinate	
their	action	without	falling	into	the	social	trap	of	collective	action.
The	main	scope	condition	of	this	argument	is	that	actors	fundamentally	intend	to	engage	in	
the	“governance	game”	but	face	social	traps	if	they	cannot	draw	on	social	capital	endowments	as	
a	source	of	interpersonal	trust.	Successfully	playing	the	governance	game	thus	requires	social	
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capital	to	substitute	for	the	state	as	a	facilitator	of	collective	action	(e.g.,	by	contract	enforcement	
and	sanctions	for	opportunistic	behavior).	Drawing	on	Elinor	Ostrom	and	T.	K.	Ahn’s	concept,	
this	paper	framed	social	capital	as	consisting	of	institutions,	networks,	and	trustworthiness.
Different	modes	of	social	interactions	(hierarchical	and	non-hierarchical	coordination)	in	the	
context	of	governance	provision	each	require	certain	social	capital	endowments.	Aggregated	
bridging	 social	 capital,	 for	 example,	 facilitates	 non-hierarchical	 coordination	 across	 social	
boundaries:	if	actors	share	high	levels	of	bridging	social	capital,	they	are	capable	of	resolving	
collective	action	issues	more	easily.	In	addition	to	the	two	modes	cited	above,	this	paper	intro-
duced	a	third	mode	of	coordination	within	confined	social	networks,	called	“clustered	coor-
dination.”	The	analysis	of	clustered	coordination	shed	some	light	on	the	“dark	side”	of	social	
capital. 
4.1 Limitations and Unresolved Questions
Explorative	in	nature,	this	paper	has	not	only	attempted	to	resolve	a	few	broad	questions	but	
has	also	generated	many	more	–	likely	even	concerning	the	limitations	of	its	own	argument.	I	
will	therefore	discuss	some	of	the	major	limitations	here	and	propose	some	points	for	future	
research.
Conceptual Caveats
The	definition	of	social	capital	as	resulting	from	trustworthiness,	social	networks,	and	formal	
and	informal	institutions,	adapted	from	Ostrom	and	Ahn	(2003),	is	a	double-edged	sword.	On	
the	one	hand,	it	is	comprehensive	enough	to	capture	social	conditions	beyond	the	influence	of	
formal	institutions,	making	it	appealing	to	the	issue	at	hand:	It	enables	scholars	to	incorporate	
social	conditions	on	different	level	of	analysis	that	are	independent	of	their	political	context	
(e.g.,	kinship	social	networks).	On	the	other	hand,	such	a	broad	definition	risks	becoming	an	
analytically	imprecise	catchall	concept.	In	this	case,	social	capital	can	be	an	omnibus	concept	
referring	to	different	social	phenomena	that	might	not	even	covary	(with	regard	to	empirical	
findings,	see	e.g.	Radnitz,	Wheatley,	and	Zürcher	2009,	718).	Moreover,	the	borrowed	conceptu-
alization	of	social	capital	incorporates	social	norms	of	reciprocity	under	the	dimension	“trust-
worthiness.”	At	the	same	time,	however,	norms	of	reciprocity	can	also	fall	under	the	dimension	
“informal	institutions”	–	an	issue	that	should	be	treated	with	caution.	This	also	holds	true	for	
certain	aspects	of	trustworthiness	and	social	networks,	which	may	turn	out	to	be	two	partially	
overlapping	dimensions.
Although	elegant	in	nature	 (the	broad	conceptualization	circumvents	the	critique	that	social	
capital	 ignores	 the	 institutional	dimension	 in	which	 it	 is	 created),	 the	 third	dimension	“in-
stitutions”	partially	undermines	the	concept’s	ability	to	capture	social	conditions	as	variables	
independent/exogenous	of	institutions.	Social	capital	instead	becomes	a	conceptual	expression	
of	interdependence	by	incorporating	institutions.	It	is	important	to	distinguish	between	the	
institutions	as	a	dimension	of	social	capital	and	the	institutions	explained	by	the	concept.	The	
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concept	of	social	capital	should	therefore	be	specified	very	precisely	to	be	employable	in	future	
empirical	research.
In	future	empirical	research,	the	institutional	sources	of	social	capital	seem	to	be	a	useful	en-
deavor	 (cp.	also	Freitag	2006,	145;	Radnitz,	Wheatley,	and	Zürcher	2009;	Rothstein	and	Stolle	
2008,	3).	When	treating	social	capital	as	an	endogenous	variable	as	this	paper	has	done	(cp.	also	
Jackman	and	Miller	1998),	future	analysis	should	pay	more	attention	to	feedback	loops	going	
from	the	provision	of	governance	to	the	creation	of	social	capital.	At	the	same	time,	economic	
and	other	contextual	factors	should	be	included	to	single	out	the	effects	of	social	conditions	
from	other	intervening	and	independent	variables.
Functionalist Fallacies?
Ultimately,	this	paper	has	followed	a	functionalist	trajectory.	It	has	implicitly	presupposed	that	
the	provision	of	governance	will	be	effective	as	long	as	collective	action	problems	are	settled	by	
the	actors	who	have	incentives	to	engage.	However,	institutionalized	modes	of	coordination	and	
well	as	particular	governance	structures	(actors)	are	not	merely	effective	solutions	to	functional	
demands;	they	also	reflect	power	differentials.	Like	institutions	in	general,	governance	is	always	a	
reflection	of	power	(Huntington	1968,	11;	North	1990,	16).	The	fallacy	of	functionalist	approaches	
to	the	analysis	of	governance	(cp.	brief	discussion	in	Börzel	and	Risse	2010,	117;	cp.	Mayntz	2001;	
2004,	71)	is	one	of	this	paper’s	blind	spots.	Incorporating	power	would	have	required	employing	a	
much	more	sophisticated	theory	of	social	capital	that	relates	social	capital	endowments	not	only	
to	actor,	group,	and	state/society	levels	of	analysis	but	also	to	hierarchical	levels	within	defined	
social	structures	(cp.	e.g.	Lin	2003).	While	including	such	an	approach	would	have	extended	the	
scope	of	this	project,	it	would	be	fruitful	to	address	the	issue	in	future	research.		
Alternative Variables
Equifinality	“challenges	and	undermines	 the	common	assumption	 that	 similar	outcomes	 in	
several	cases	must	have	a	common	cause”	(George	and	Bennett	2005,	161).	Governance	in	areas	
of	 limited	 statehood	 is	 a	multivariate	phenomenon	 that	may	be	 facilitated	by	different	 suf-
ficient	but	not	necessary	conditions.	This	paper	has	presupposed	that	social	capital	can	be	a	
functional	equivalent	for	the	hierarchical	enforcement	of	rules	by	states	to	facilitate	collective	
action.	However,	 there	may	be	 alternative	 variables	whose	 influence	 should	be	measured	 in	
multivariate	data	analyses.	Potential	variables	that	may	influence	the	role	of	social	capital,	add	
to	its	coefficient	of	determination,	or	even	serve	as	alternatives	include:	organizational	legacies	
and	cultures,	institutional	path	dependencies	(cp.	e.g.	Krasner	1984,	240;	Thelen	1999),	different	
cultural	variables	(Harrison	and	Huntington	2000)	“amoral	familism”	(Banfield	1958),	and	sym-
bolic	capital	in	the	context	of	horizontal	coordination	(Leutner	2007).
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4.2 Future Research
This	project	has	offered	arguments	and	propositions	that	need	more	conceptual	and	theoretical	
research.	First,	the	main	concepts	need	more	specification	and	more	elaboration	with	regard	to	
the	theory	proposed.	The	limitations	discussed	offer	some	direction	for	such	future	research.	
Second,	hypotheses	need	to	be	derived	from	the	propositions	outlined.	Subsequently,	empirical	
research	should	follow	providing	evidence	for	 the	claim	that	social	capital	partially	explains	
some	of	the	variance	of	governance	in	areas	of	limited	statehood.	One	of	the	main	tasks	will	be	
to	collect	sufficient	empirical	data.	One	of	the	problems	in	this	context	is	that	social	capital	“is	
not	directly	observable.	We	can	measure	only	its	manifestations	or	behavioral	consequences”	
(Radnitz,	Wheatley,	and	Zürcher	2009,	712).	Future	research	has	to	follow	an	operationalization	
strategy	to	derive	proxy	indicators	and	measurements	for	social	capital.	Most	of	the	previous	
empirical	 research	on	 social	 capital	 has	 relied	on	 cross-national	 survey	data,	mainly	 on	 the	
World	Values	Survey	(World	Values	Survey	Association	2009).	The	survey	includes	responses	by	
individuals	about	their	social	and	political	opinions,	which	are	then	widely	used	to	measure	
indicators	of	social	capital	 (Adam	2007;	Fukuyama	2001,	15;	Gabriel	et	al.	2002).	Quantitative	
survey	data	on	social	embeddedness	and	on	interpersonal	trust	as	an	outcome	of	social	capital	
offer	a	promising	starting	point	in	this	regard.	However,	data	on	lower	levels	of	aggregation	
(e.g.,	community	 level/organizational	 level)	are	necessary	to	measure	different	types	of	social	
capital	in	relation	to	particular	instances	of	governance	in	areas	of	limited	statehood	(see	e.g.	
World	Bank	2011).	Another	way	to	measure	social	capital	by	proxy	is	empirical	network	analysis	
and	other	empirical	data	on	organizations	and	their	members	(cp.	Fukuyama	2001,	14ff.).	When	
linking	 social	 capital	 to	 different	 types	 of	 non-state	 governance,	measuring	 the	 dependent	
variable	 posees	 the	 greatest	 challenges.	 Ursula	 Schröder,	 outlining	 how	 governance	 in	 the	
security	sector	can	be	measured	by	different	indexes,	pinpoints	the	main	problem,	which	can	
be	applied	to	non-state	governance	more	broadly:
„None	of	the	available	indicator	sets	sufficiently	takes	the	role	of	non-state	actors	in	
security	sector	governance	into	account.	The	rising	influence	of	armed	non-state	
security	actors	such	as	militias,	rebels,	clan	chiefs	or	warlords	in	areas	of	limited	
statehood	 strongly	 influences	both	 security	delivery	 and	 the	quality	of	 security	
sector	 governance	 (see	 further	 Schneckener,	 2007)	…	 Since	 available	 indicators	
focus	primarily	on	 the	 characteristics	of	 state	 institutions	 and	actors,	however,	
the	 impact	 of	 private	 security	 actors	 on	 security	 sector	 governance	 remains	
inadequately	reflected	in	available	datasets“	(Schröder	2010,	31-2).
4.3 Policy Lessons for Institutional Transfers
Institutional	 transfers	 within	 international	 state-building	 endeavors	 have	 yielded	 mixed	
outcomes.	Despite	various	forms	of	“governance	without	the	state,”	there	is	no	feasible	alternative	
to	 state	 institutions,	 especially	 concerning	 inclusive	 democratic	 institutions.	Yet,	 the	mixed	
outcomes	suggest	that	transferring	institutions	depends	on	variables	that	have	not	sufficiently	
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been	explored	thus	far.	Political	sociology	has	always	argued	that	state	institutions	in	the	OECD	
world	have	a	social	context.	This	paper	has	provided	some	arguments	for	why	this	is	also	the	
case	for	governance	without	the	state.	It	seems	more	than	likely	that	transferred	institutions	
are	 no	 different,	 since	 they	 also	 depend	 on	particular	 social	 contexts	while	 generating	new	
kinds	of	social	capital.	This	argument	is	not	new	to	state-building	discourse	(see	e.g.	Chandler	
2007).	 Focusing	 on	 social	 capital,	 however,	 puts	 a	 slightly	 different	 spin	 on	 the	 issue.	 Since	
social	capital	is	partially	dependent	on	institutional	contexts,	it	can	be	created	by	institutional	
change	(Fukuyama	2001,	17ff.;	Levi	1996;	Radnitz,	Wheatley,	and	Zürcher	2009)	that	is	“vital	to	
the	proper	functioning	of	formal	public	institutions”	(Fukuyama	2001,	12).	However,	if	certain	
types	of	social	capital	endowments	promote	non-state	or	even	“clustered”	governance,	as	this	
paper	argues,	rather	than	promoting	the	functioning	of	transferred	institutions,	the	outlook	for	
institutional	transfers	of	formal	institutions	looks	particularly	dim.	
Corruption	 fostered	by	bonding	 social	 capital	 (Harris	 2007)	 is	 only	one	problem	 that	 arises	
in	this	context.	If	social	capital	endowments	are	not	clocked	with	transfer	outcomes,	 formal	
institutions	 have	 to	 be	 merged	 with	 other	 institutions	 sustained	 by	 certain	 social	 capital	
endowments	 in	place.	Here,	one	of	Boege	et	 al.’s	 conclusions	becomes	particularly	 relevant:	
“On	many	occasions,	the	only	way	to	make	state	institutions	work	is	through	the	utilization	of	
kin-based	and	other	traditional	networks”	(Boege,	Brown,	and	Clements	2009,	16).	Tilly	outlines	
that	democracy	is	affected	by	the	role	of	trust	networks:	
„The	 future	 of	 democracy,	 for	 example,	 depends	 on	 connections	 between	 trust	
networks	 and	 political	 regimes;	 extensive	 withdrawal	 of	 trust	 networks	 from	
public	politics,	when	it	occurs,	damages	democracy“	(Tilly	2004,	11).
This	paper	has	offered	insights	for	future	analyses	of	the	social	conditions	underlying	pros-
pects	for	social	change	in	many	parts	of	the	world.	
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